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Abstract
Large-scale networks are among the most complex software infrastructures in
existence. Unfortunately, the increasing complexity of its software require-
ments leads to a rich variety of nondeterministic failure modes and anoma-
lies. Research on testing and debugging modern distributed software has
focused on designing comprehensive record and replay systems, but the large
volumes of recordings often hinder the efficiency and scalability of these de-
signs. Here, we argue for a different approach. Namely, we take the position
that deterministic network execution would vastly simplify the distributed
software testing and debugging process. This thesis presents the design and
implementation of a network architecture for interactive testing and debug-
ging that provides deterministic network execution of distributed software
in highly distributed and dynamic environments. We design efficient and
scalable algorithms for both control and data traffics in modern wide-area
networks. In addition, we further describe several interactive primitives to
reduce the time and effort on testing and debugging of large-scale distributed
software. We demonstrate our system’s advantages by analyzing nondeter-
ministic ordering and timing bugs in popular real-world distributed software,
XORP, Quagga, and lighttpd. Using Rocketfuel topologies and traffic data
from a Tier-1 backbone, we show that our design is practical and scalable
for interactive fault diagnosis in large networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Testing and debugging are two of the most crucial software-quality-assurance
activities. Unfortunately, they are also two of the most formidable and
time-consuming software-development tasks. Literature reports that with
the current software development practice, projects spend up to 50% of the
development time on testing and debugging [1]. This large amount of testing
and debugging time significantly reduces the productivity of today’s software
development.
To simplify the testing and debugging activities, one school of research
has focused on applying fully automated techniques to verify, test, and de-
bug complex systems. Commonly proposed methods work by checking the
behavior of the system against a model that describes how the system should
behave [2, 3, 4]. While some problems can be identified or avoided in this way,
fully modeling the logic of a complex system requires complex models, thus
increasing the probability of bugs in the model itself. In addition, model-
based techniques typically “detect” problems instead of indicating how the
problem can be repaired, still requiring the troubleshooter to understand the
complex dynamics and state of the underlying software to design a solution.
Finally, while automated techniques have been developed to localize memory
faults [5], avoid concurrency bugs [6], and verify network reachability [7, 8]
and accessibility [9, 10], the larger class of logical or semantic errors seems
to fundamentally require human knowledge to solve.
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In this thesis, we take the position that manual labor by domain experts is
a necessary evil of testing and debugging problems in software, but that this
process would be vastly simpler with architectural support for testing and
debugging. More specifically, an architecture that supports testing and de-
bugging primitives such as replays, breakpoints, single-steps, and backtraces
can greatly reduce the time and effort spent in the testing and debugging
processes. However, while tools such as GDB [11] and LLDB [12] exist to
isolate problems on a single machine, today we lack a practical tool for in-
teractive testing and debugging of distributed software in modern wide-area
networks. We propose an architecture for interactive testing and debugging
of distributed software.
Designing an architecture for interactive testing and debugging of dis-
tributed software needs to address several unique challenges that distributed
software brings, compared to standalone software.
Lack of centralized operating systems: Existing testing and debug-
ging tools for standalone software utilize several features of modern operat-
ing systems to achieve primitives such as breakpoints and single-steps. In
addition, a centralized operating system synchronizes individual processes
of a software system on a single machine, which makes it easier for an op-
erator to test and debug a collection of processes at once. However, the
lack of a counterpart in testing and debugging distributed software makes
the process significantly more challenging. Although the recent advent of
Software-Defined Networking [13] (SDN) provides an operating-system-like
centralized network controller, some of the testing and debugging primitives
cannot be trivially ported to distributed software. Moreover, to test and
debug existing distributed software, we still need a way to coordinate and
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synchronize it in existing networks.
Less reliable communication channels and longer communication
delay between components: Local communication channels (e.g., shared
memory) are more reliable than remote ones (e.g., UDP over Ethernet), and
the former can be orders of magnitude faster than the latter [14]. The rel-
ative reliable and fast communication channel on a local machine allows
testing and debugging tools to engage extensive interactions with the tar-
get software. This is especially valuable when the target software consists
of multiple processes, since the testing and debugging tools can quickly ex-
change information with all the processes to enable complex algorithms. On
the other hand, communications between testing and debugging tools and
distributed software components are slower and less reliable, and this forces
us to design tools that support useful testing and debugging primitives with
minimum interactions between distributed components.
Larger scales and less control: While standalone software can have hun-
dreds of threads, distributed software can be consist of thousands of devices,
and each device has multiple threads. This puts scalability as one of the most
important aspects of the design. In addition, distributed software tends to
have complex dependencies over each other. For example, an HTTP server
and an HTTP client depend on DNS, OSPF, BGP, and other protocol im-
plementations to work correctly. These dependencies require a testing and
debugging tool to be able to analyze multiple instances of distributed soft-
ware at once, which further stress the importance of scalability. Finally,
unlike testing and debugging standalone software, which an operator can
assume control over the entire machine, testing and debugging distributed
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software over the Internet often means that an operator does not have total
control over all the network components. As a result, we need to design a
testing and debugging tool that can still work even when we have only partial
control over the distributed software.
Heterogeneous networks: The scale of distributed software leads to an-
other related testing and debugging challenge – heterogeneity. Distributed
software can be operated in a network connecting devices with different oper-
ating systems and protocols. Each of these systems can act differently under
the same situation, and this further complicated the testing and debugging
process. Furthermore, the scale and heterogeneity make it more difficult
to replicate the production environment in the testing and debugging envi-
ronment. To avoid affecting other software in the production environment,
developers often move the faulty software to the testing and debugging en-
vironment (e.g., a separate machine or network). While it is straightforward
to replicate the environments for standalone software, it is extremely diffi-
cult to replicate the exact network environment where the faulty distributed
software is operated on. Hence, we need to design a tool that can reproduce
the exact software behaviors in different environments.
More sources of nondeterministic behaviors: Nondeterministic be-
haviors of software lead to exponential explosion in possible executions [15],
which increases the time and effort spent on testing and debugging, as devel-
opers need to examine a large set of possible behaviors [16, 17]. As a result,
nondeterministic bugs are one of the most challenging type of bugs to detect
and troubleshoot, since operators are requires analyzing them without even
being able to reproduce them precisely. For standalone software, events such
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as user input, thread scheduling, and memory reordering are the sources
of nondeterministic software behaviors [18]. For distributed software, not
only does it inherit the sources of nondeterministic behaviors of standalone
software, additional events such as message reordering and message/timer in-
teractions further complicate the testing and debugging process. Hence, we
need to design a tool that is able to eliminate these nondeterministic events,
and precisely reproduce the behaviors of distributed software.
Previous works attempt to address these challenges by running multi-
ple standalone debuggers on each network device, and coordinating these
standalone debuggers to test and debug distributed software [19, 20]. How-
ever, this solution doesn’t address the issues induced by heterogeneity and
nondeterminism. Further attempts have employed recording mechanisms
to assist human operators in testing and debugging large-scale distributed
software. These works include packet capture and replay tools that record
and replay packets at individual nodes [21], tools that correlate record-
ings across distributed nodes to provide system-wide reproducibility for dis-
tributed software [22], and tools that enable centrally controlled record and
replay of distributed software by leveraging the structure of SDN controller
domains [23, 24]. Unfortunately, while these schemes improve operators’
ability to analyze distributed software, the large volumes of recordings hin-
der the scalability of these solutions. In fact, even the authors of these works
point out that a comprehensive recording of all events in an entire produc-
tion network is infeasible [22, 24]. Consequently, operators often enable only
partial recordings in production networks, e.g., logging only packet headers
or logging only at specific network locations. However, solutions based on
partial recordings can fail to reproduce bugs triggered by nondeterministic
behaviors, e.g., message orderings or unsynchronized clocks. Indeed, testing
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and debugging these nondeterministic bugs is challenging. Since a bug may
happen only when certain messages arrive at a specific node in a specific
ordering, if operators didn’t select the node to record messages beforehand,
it is extremely difficult to reproduce the bug. Two types of nondeterministic
bugs are particularly notorious in distributed software: ordering bugs that
appear only when certain messages occur in specific orderings and timing
bugs that appear only when certain messages are processed at specific tim-
ings. In the following section, we give a couple of motivating examples of
nondeterministic bugs to show the challenges that operators might face when
testing and debugging distributed software.
1.1 Motivating Examples
To further demonstrate the challenges of testing and debugging distributed
software, we examine two known nondeterministic bugs in the BGP module
of XORP 0.4 [25] and the Routing Information Protocol (RIP) module of
Quagga 0.96.5 [26]. More specifically, we describe an ordering bug in the
BGP path selection process and a timing bug in the RIP timer refresh pro-
cedure. These examples present the challenges a troubleshooter might face
when testing and debugging distributed software after observing erroneous
behaviors.
Ordering bug in XORP BGP path selection: A BGP module should
select the best path among all paths it receives from its peers. To do so,
it checks all valid paths against a list of rules [27]. There are dozens of
rules in the BGP path selection process, but to understand the XORP bug,
we need to know only three of them. First, the selection process compares
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Figure 1.1: An illustration of an ordering bug in the BGP module of XORP
0.4.
the AS path length of each path, and those with shortest AS path length are
selected as preferable paths. Then, these preferable paths are grouped by the
neighboring AS of each path. Within each group, paths with lowest multi-
exit discriminator (MED) are selected. All selected paths are checked against
the last rule that compares the interior gateway protocol (IGP) distance of
the paths. Finally, the path with the lowest IGP distance is selected as the
best path.
One peculiar aspect of this process is the MED rule. Because the rule
checks the MED attribute only within a group of paths that have the same
neighboring AS, it creates a non-transitive ordering among paths. For exam-
ple, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, an AS with three routers R1, R2, and R3
peers with another two ASs at external routers ER1, ER2, and ER3. These
external routers advertise three paths p1, p2, and p3. Through neighboring
routers R1 and R2, these paths eventually arrive at R3. All three paths have
the same AS path length, while p1 and p2 have the same neighboring AS. In
addition, p1 has a MED attribute of 10, p2 has 5, and p3 has 20. Finally, p1
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has an IGP distance of 10, p2 has 30, and p3 has 20. Under these settings,
when R3 considers only a pair of paths each time, p2 wins over p1, p3 wins
over p2, but p1 wins over p3. Thus, to avoid choosing a less preferable path,
a BGP module on R3 should compare all valid paths whenever the process
is executed and select p3 as the best path.
Version 0.4 of the XORP BGP module, however, makes a mistake here.
When receiving an incoming path, it only compares the path with the current
best path. As a result, the outcome of the selection process implementation
can differ across executions: if the ordering of incoming paths at R3 is p1,
p2, and p3, then p3 is selected as the best path; unfortunately, if the ordering
of the incoming path is p1, p3, and p2, then p2 is incorrectly selected as the
best path.
Coordinating a collection of standalone debuggers to troubleshoot this bug
doesn’t make the task easier, since XORP will continue to behave nondeter-
ministically. Alternatively, using only partial recordings to record and replay
this bug might not address the issue, either. An operator can enable log-
ging for network nondeterminism at border routers R1 and R2 in Figure 1.1.
When the bug is triggered, the operator replays log contents to reproduce
the bug within a testing and debugging network. However, because nonde-
terminism is recorded only at border routers, the set of paths can still reach
router R3 in a nondeterministic fashion. The operator faces complications
when experimenting with execution in the testing and debugging network
due to the inability to mirror behavior of the production network.
Timing bug in Quagga RIP timer refresh: To handle network dy-
namics, RIP maintains a timer for each route in its routing table. When
receiving route announcements, if the route is already in the routing table,
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Figure 1.2: An illustration of a timing bug in the RIP module of Quagga
0.96.5.
RIP updates the timer for the route. When a timer expires, RIP removes
the route from the routing table. This mechanism ensures that the routing
table contains only valid paths.
One subtle point of this process is that when comparing a route announce-
ment with a route in the routing table, RIP must check both the destination
field as well as the next-hop field. The Quagga RIP module, however, makes
a mistake by only considering the destination field. As a result, the imple-
mentation contains a timing bug that triggers a black hole when certain route
announcements are received at particular timings.
As illustrated in Figure 1.2, a router R1 connects to two other routers R2
and R3. Both R2 and R3 provide R1 routes to the same destination, and R2
serves as the main router, while R3 is the backup. All routers are running
RIP, so what should happen is that R1 maintains the route through R2 in
its routing table and refreshes the timer only when receiving announcements
from R2. When R2 goes down, due to the lack of periodic announcement,
the timer for the route will eventually time out. Then, R1 will remove the
route through R2 from its routing table and pick up the route through R3.
However, because the RIP implementation in Quagga 0.96.5 checks only
the destination field when comparing announcements with routes in the rout-
ing table, R1 will refresh the timer for the route through R2 when receiving
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announcements from not only R2 but also R3. In this case, when R2 goes
down, two scenarios can happen. If announcements from R3 reach R1 af-
ter the route through R2 times out, then R1 correctly picks up the new
route through R3. Unfortunately, if announcements from R3 reach R1 before
the route through R2 times out, then R1 will incorrectly refreshes the route
through R2 in the routing table. Even worse, the periodic announcements
from R3 will keep the invalid route through R2 in the routing table and
effectively create a black hole.
Again, coordinating a collection of standalone debuggers or using partial
recordings of only message events to troubleshoot this bug can take a lot
of time and resources, due to nondeterministic timer events embedded in
distributed software. For example, when using a standalone debugger, a
human troubleshooter will experience timers going off unexpectedly while
stepping through one instance of the Quagga RIP module on one of the
routers. Moreover, to be able to reproduce the bug, it is also challenging
for the human troubleshooter to manually coordinate the timing of message
receipt and timer expirations.
1.2 Thesis Goal
In this thesis, we design a network architecture to support interactive test-
ing and debugging of distributed software. To clarify our goals, we give a
simple example of how our proposed architecture might be used in practice.
Imagine that a network operator of a large ISP receives a phone call from a
complaining customer, indicating that their Internet connectivity appears to
fail at random times, with a large outage occurring the previous night. To
diagnose the problem, the network operator creates a separate testing and
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debugging instance of the production network based on the last checkpoint
before the outage occurs, and places a breakpoint that is triggered when
the route between the customer and a remote network becomes unavailable.
The operator then runs the testing and debugging instance. When the route
is withdrawn, the testing and debugging instance is paused, and the op-
erator may then issue single-step and backtrace commands to analyze the
states of the network. The operator notices that the path changed because a
withdrawal message was received from a neighboring router, and hence the
operator places a breakpoint triggered on the creation of that update. By
repeating this process, the operator localizes the problem to a single router,
which repeatedly sends updates, even though it is receiving no new external
events. The operator forms a hypothesis that the router’s software is faulty,
and to test the hypothesis rolls back the router’s software to an earlier ver-
sion. To test the workaround, the operator plays the testing and debugging
network forward (injecting synthetic external updates) to see if any oscilla-
tions will take place over the next several days. Since the problem does not
reoccur, the solution in the testing and debugging network is merged back
into the production network.
This example demonstrates several goals of our proposed network archi-
tecture, and we will detail them as follows.
Coordinate and synchronize distributed components: The testing
and debugging process can be vastly simplified if the network architecture
can coordinate and synchronize distributed events so that troubleshooters can
focus on the behavior of the distributed software as a whole. For example,
when troubleshooters trace the problematic updates through the network,
they might want to slow down or even pause the execution of an instance of
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the software on a specific router. Without coordination and synchronization,
although troubleshooters can manipulate the execution on a single router, un-
coordinated events on other network devices might trigger new updates to be
sent to the router and disrupt the testing and debugging process. Hence, one
of the goals of our network architecture is to coordinate and synchronize the
components of the distributed software, and make them execute as a single
cohesive entity. As a result, troubleshooters can manipulate the distributed
software as a single entity, and can put their focus on the problematic event.
Handle variable network delay and packet loss: When coordinat-
ing and synchronizing distributed components, the network architecture in-
evitably needs to interact with the distributed software. Nevertheless, the
quality of the communication channel varies from networks to networks. For
instance, while some networks deploy Ethernet throughout, some networks
adopt wireless channels as the last mile connection. Thus, our network archi-
tecture has to accommodate various network environments, and also needs to
perform reliably and efficiently. Moreover, to allow troubleshooters to analyze
the distributed software, the network architecture is required to reproduce
the exact software behavior in both the production network and the testing
and debugging network, even when the two networks have totally different
network conditions. Furthermore, inside the testing and debugging network,
the architecture needs to guarantee the same outcome when executing the
same distributed software.
Reproduce network execution at scale: To assist troubleshooters, the
network architecture has to deterministically reproduce distributed software
execution for large-scale networks. To achieve this, not only does the ar-
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chitecture needs to handle variable network delay and packet loss, it also
has to deal with other nondeterministic events in the network, e.g., config-
uration modifications by the operators, updates from neighboring networks,
messages between distributed components, and interactions of messages and
timers. In addition, the network architecture is required to address these
issues for modern wide-area networks, which may be consist of more than
hundreds of network devices. Our goal is to come up with algorithms that
can scale well with the network size and the number of active flows.
Support essential testing and debugging primitives: In addition to
deterministically reproducing network execution, the network architecture
also needs to support various testing and debugging primitives to simplify
the testing and debugging task for troubleshooters. Our goal is to support the
most essential primitives that can greatly reduce the time and effort spent
on testing and debugging distributed software. We discuss these essential
primitives as follows.
• Single-step: When testing and debugging distributed software, trou-
bleshooters often needs to slow down the software execution and ex-
amine the behavior step by step. The single-step primitive provides
such functionality, and it allows troubleshooters to analyze the behav-
ior of each component in details. In addition, the primitive can also
step in different granularities, e.g., step through every machine instruc-
tion, step through every updates, or step through every link failures.
The various options let troubleshooters decide the most suitable way
to examine the bug in question.
• Breakpoint: The single-step primitive alone is not sufficient to make
the testing and debugging process more efficient. Oftentimes, we can
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further reduce the time and effort of testing and debugging by auto-
matically pausing and notifying troubleshooters whenever some user
specified conditions are met. For example, to analyze a bug related
to update messages, troubleshooters may only be interested in step-
ping through the network execution whenever an update message is in
the network. The breakpoint primitive accomplishes such tasks, and
greatly speeds up the testing and debugging process.
• Backtrace: When troubleshooters utilize the breakpoint primitive to
pause the distributed software at a specific condition, not only do they
want to make the software step forwards to analyze the further software
behavior, but they also would like to trace the execution backwards to
understand how the software gets into its current condition. The back-
trace primitive fulfills this goal, and complements the other primitive.
More specifically, troubleshooters can specify an event in the network,
and the backtrace primitive will list all the previous events that lead
to this specific event.
Collectively, these essential primitives enable troubleshooters to pause, for-
ward, and rewind the distributed software execution. These functionalities
allow troubleshooters to easily examine the software behaviors and analyze
the anomalies.
In the next section, we give an overview of our design of the network
architecture to accomplish these goals.
1.3 Solution Overview
To achieve these goals, in this thesis, we present a network testing and
debugging architecture that allows a troubleshooter to analyze distributed
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software bugs after detecting erroneous behaviors of the software. Our ar-
chitecture simplifies interactive distributed software testing and debugging
through deterministic network execution. Namely, when given the same set
of external events (e.g., messages from external routers, or failures of links
and routers), we make every node in the network always processes events
in a deterministic ordering and timing. Accordingly, with this network ar-
chitecture, troubleshooters can adopt partial recordings and still be able to
efficiently reproduce nondeterministic bugs at scale.
To enable deterministic network execution, the architecture eliminates all
sources of nondeterministic internal events in a network, and relies on par-
tial recordings to record and replay nondeterministic external events [18].
Specifically, we ensure each node receives messages and fires local timers in
a deterministic fashion. To provide more testing and debugging primitives
without introducing prohibitive overheads to distributed software, we design
separate algorithms to handle control and data traffics.
The network architecture supports single-steps, breakpoints, and back-
traces by utilizing deterministic network execution, which allows the archi-
tecture to provide these testing and debugging primitives without extensive
recordings. This guarantees that our proposed architecture is able to scale
to modern wide-area networks.
Figure 1.3 gives an overview of our architecture. In this figure, a cou-
ple of distributed software instances are running in the production network
infrastructure. Instead of letting these software instances directly run on
the network nodes, we implements a production network shim layer between
them and the operating systems. The shim layer in the production network
provides deterministic network execution by eliminating nondeterministic in-
ternal events, and partially recording nondeterministic events. To eliminate
15
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Figure 1.3: The network architecture for testing and debugging distributed
software.
nondeterministic internal events, we build upon existing researches to re-
move nondeterministic local events [18, 28, 29], and design novel algorithms
to handle nondeterministic distributed events. Based on their distinct char-
acteristic, we design different algorithms for both the control and data traffics
for efficiency and scalability.
To test and debug distributed software in the architecture, troubleshoot-
ers utilize the debugging coordinator to execute a separate instance of the
distributed software in a testing and debugging network. Based on the sit-
uation, troubleshooters can launch multiple testing and debugging networks
at once, or run multiple pieces of distributed software in a single network. In
the testing and debugging network, we execute the distributed software on
a testing and debugging network shim layer. Using partial recordings from
the production network, this shim layer communicates with the debugging
coordinator to deterministically reproduce distributed software executions.
In addition, the shim layer supports testing and debugging primitives for
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troubleshooters to analyze the distributed software. By issuing testing and
debugging commands from the debugging coordinator, troubleshooters can
examine modern large-scale distributed software in details.
Our testing and debugging network architecture consists of three major
components, and we discuss them as follows.
Deterministic network execution of control traffic: We define con-
trol traffic as the traffic that the distributed software uses to coordinate and
synchronize between components. Examples include control-plane software
traffic [25, 26] and distributed service traffic [30, 31]. Messages in the control
traffic tend to be small, and are normally broadcast. To enable determin-
istic network execution for control traffic, we leverage an “optimistic” ap-
proach [32, 33, 34, 35]. Each node independently decides on a pseudorandom
sequence of events, and then lets the network execute in an arbitrary fash-
ion. If the order in which events execute is different from the pseudorandom
sequence, the network is “rolled back” to an earlier state, and played forward
with the correct ordering. We introduce a novel pseudorandom sequence to
reduce to the number of rollbacks, and hence minimize the overheads.
Deterministic network execution of data traffic: Contrary to control
traffic, data traffic is the traffic that the distributed software uses to transfer
information between components. Examples include web service traffic [36]
and peer-to-peer file service traffic [37]. The data traffic usually is consist of
a series of messages sent to a dedicated destination. To enable determinis-
tic network execution for data traffic, we utilize our study in synchronized
clocks [38]. Each node in the network uses synchronization protocols to adjust
its local clock. Then, each sender node tags every packets with a timestamp
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according to its local clock, and each receiving node delivers the packet to the
distributed software after dealing with the distribution of the network delay
and the clock skew and drift. The algorithm takes into account the data
traffic characteristic, and is able to efficiently achieve deterministic network
execution.
Testing and debugging primitives using deterministic network ex-
ecution: Existing works provide testing and debugging primitives through
comprehensive recordings [23, 24]. However, this approach demands large
storage requirements which can hinder its supports for modern wide-area
networks. To address this issue, we provide testing and debugging primi-
tives by leveraging deterministic network execution. More specifically, we
provide the single-step primitive by designing a lockstep algorithm for the
control traffic, and a reproduction algorithm for the data traffic. Moreover,
we speed up the breakpoint primitive by caching snapshots of the determin-
istic network execution. Finally, we implements the backtrace primitive by
leveraging the checkpoint and deterministic replay abilities of the testing and
debugging network architecture. By avoiding comprehensive recordings, our
implementations of the testing and debugging primitives can accommodate
large-scale distributed software.
1.4 Thesis Contribution
Our thesis has several contributions, and we summarize them as follows.
Eliminate internal nondeterminism for distributed software: The
scale of modern wide-area network prevents architecture from adopting com-
prehensive recording techniques [22, 24]. To address this, a series of works
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proposes the use of deterministic execution of software. By removing internal
nondeterminism from a system, deterministic execution enables reproducibil-
ity of the system with only recordings of external events [18]. Furthermore,
deterministic execution also simplifies the internal interactions of different
system components, and hence, reduces the complexity of testing and de-
bugging the system. Unfortunately, efforts on this series of works have only
been focused on standalone but not distributed systems [18, 28, 29]. We
propose a testing and debugging network architecture to complement these
previous works. Our architecture removes internal nondeterministic events
from distributed software, and enables deterministic network execution.
Support deterministic network execution of both control and data
traffics: The control and data traffics demonstrate distinct characteristics,
and require different algorithms to handle them efficiently. We study the
attributes of each traffic type, and design specific algorithms to enable deter-
ministic network execution. To deal with broadcasts from the control traffic,
we construct algorithms utilizing speculative execution and a novel way of
ordering internal events. To manipulate elephant flows from the data traf-
fic, we come up with algorithms leveraging synchronized clocks and a new
buffering scheme at end hosts. These separate algorithms designed for differ-
ent traffic types make our testing and debugging network architecture able
to accommodate all types of traffic in modern networks.
Implement testing and debugging primitives using deterministic
execution: Not only does deterministic network execution reproduces dis-
tributed software behaviors, but it also enables us to come up with novel
designs for testing and debugging primitives. In our network architecture,
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we implement the single-step primitive that allows troubleshooters to slow
down the execution of distributed software and analyze it in details. We also
construct the breakpoint primitive that enables troubleshooters to specify in-
terested network conditions, and pauses the distributed software when those
conditions occur. In addition, we design the backtrace primitive that grants
troubleshooters abilities to track the sources of specific network events. With
these testing and debugging primitives, our network architecture is able to
greatly assist troubleshooters in testing and debugging nondeterministic dis-
tributed software bugs such as ordering bugs and timing bugs.
Design efficient and scalable testing and debugging network archi-
tecture: Modern distributed software has been increasing in both scale and
complexity. As a result, not only do we need to design a network architecture
that supports testing and debugging functionalities, we also have to make it
efficient and scalable to be able to handle distributed software in data cen-
ters, enterprise networks, and even the Internet. To achieve this goal, we
come up with novel algorithms on ordering and buffering control and data
traffics to reduce overheads both in network devices and end hosts. Through
experiments with real-world topologies and traffic traces, we demonstrate
that our proposed testing and debugging network architecture can help trou-
bleshooters analyze distributed software in modern large-scale networks.
Enable further applications of deterministic network execution:
We propose a network architecture that supports deterministic network exe-
cution, which also facilitates various useful applications. We discuss a couple
of examples as follows.
• Replication: Replications enable load balancing and graceful recovery.
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However, nondeterministic behaviors make it challenging to replicate
distributed software executions efficiently, since all the nondetermin-
istic actions are required to be recorded. By eliminating all internal
nondeterministic events, our architecture simplifies replications of dis-
tributed software, as we can run multiple instances of the distributed
software in parallel, and replicates all the external events.
• Security: Intrusion detection and prevention systems are known to suf-
fer from nondeterministic network noises [39]. Our architecture elimi-
nates these noises, and assists intrusion detection and prevention sys-
tems in analyzing activities in the network. The architecture also allows
security experts to closely examine network behaviors by leveraging the
testing and debugging primitives.
1.5 Thesis Contents
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the back-
grounds. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 discuss the algorithms that make pro-
duction network traffics behave deterministically. Chapter 3 introduces a
speculative algorithm along with a novel event ordering technique to handle
control traffic [32, 33, 34, 35]. Chapter 4 utilizes our study in synchronized
clocks [38] to construct a new data transferring and buffering algorithm for
data traffic. Then, Chapter 5 describes the algorithms that enable determin-
istic network execution in the testing and debugging network, and demon-
strates the implementations of the single-step, breakpoint, and backtrace
primitives. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Backgrounds
Our testing and debugging architecture builds upon existing works and pro-
vide new primitives to support debugging of distributed software in large-
scale networks. We leverage works on distributed algorithms [40, 41, 42] to
construct the foundations of our design. Our work builds on two key areas:
Deterministic execution: DDOS [43] is the closest work to our design.
Similar to our design, DDOS introduces deterministic network execution by
manipulating message orderings. DDOS runs the distributed software in
virtual time, annotates each message with a virtual timestamp, and orders
the messages by the source nodes’ predefined identification numbers. When
the distributed software tries to read a message from the network, DDOS
blocks the read request until the correct message arrives. While DDOS pro-
vides deterministic network execution to general software, the blocked reads
introduced by the algorithm can slow down software that requires constant
communications, such as distributed software. Our architecture improves the
software’s performance in a production network by leveraging speculative ex-
ecution and introducing an innovative message ordering that minimizes the
number of rollbacks.
CADRE [44] is an architecture that supports deterministic replay for hard-
ware debugging. The main focus of their design is to enforce determinism
in buses. With a similar goal, our design deals with larger-scaled networks
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with different delay and synchronization constraints.
Jefferson introduced the concept of Virtual Time [42] to provide synchro-
nization for distributed software. Virtual Time is used to determine the
ordering of messages, and rollbacks are used to make sure that messages are
indeed processed in that order. However, the concept of Virtual Time can-
not directly and efficiently be generalized to all software. In our testing and
debugging architecture, the message ordering that uses group numbers and
estimated delays solidifies and optimizes the Virtual Time idea in the context
of distributed software.
Mechanisms enabling deterministic execution of parallel programs have
long been the focus of extensive research. DPJ [28], Dthreads [45], Kendo [46],
Tern [29], Determinator [47], and dOS [18] have focused on providing deter-
ministic execution of parallel software with different approaches. DPJ sup-
ports determinism at the language level, which ensures more control over the
software, but sacrifices generality. On the other hand, Dthreads, Kendo, and
Tern offer determinism at the library level, and Determinator and dOS pro-
vide determinism at the OS level. These designs allow the system to handle
a wider range of software. Our design takes a step further and guarantees
deterministic execution of distributed software. We leverage a user-space li-
brary design, which allows us to support a wide range of distributed software.
Deterministic replay: Instead of providing deterministic execution, sev-
eral works such as Flashback [48], Friday [22], OFRewind [24], Pip [49], Re-
Virt [50], TTVM [51], and WiDS Checker [52] use comprehensive recordings
to ensure reproducibility of execution. However, as the authors of Friday and
OFRewind point out, the large storage requirements for logs are one of the
limitations of these works. This limitation hinders these works from scaling
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to large systems, because processing a large amount of logs is prohibitively
expensive. Our work targets large-scale networks, where maintaining com-
prehensive logs may not be tractable.
Deterministic transmission latency: Another thread of work has put
efforts on building real-time networks. The work aims to offer predictable
worst case transmission latency, while our design focuses on providing de-
terministic transmission latency. TTEthernet [53] uses synchronized clocks
to schedule periodic message transmissions among end hosts to reduce in-
network queuing. The result is that those periodic messages are guaranteed
to arrive before the deadline. Our design also uses synchronized clocks, but
we accommodate in-network queuing to provide deterministic arrival time,
and, furthermore, we can deal with more general traffic patterns other than
periodic message transmissions.
Speculative execution: Our architecture leverages speculative execution,
which has been previously used in many systems, for example databases [54]
and multi-processor environments [55]. Our work studies the applicability
and efficiency of such speculative techniques in large-scale networks. We,
further, give several optimizations to reduce the overhead of rollbacks.
Interactive control: Our testing and debugging architecture not only en-
sures that a production network executes in a reproducible fashion, but also
enables the network operators to control the execution in a debugging net-
work. Interactive control has been used previously in several works. PDB [20]
combines GDB with another tool, DISH, to interactively launch, manage,
and troubleshoot distributed processes. The effect is similar to using multi-
ple GDB instances to troubleshoot multiple processes simultaneously. Simi-
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larly, Clairvoyant [19] supports source-level troubleshooting in wireless sen-
sor networks by binding one GDB instance to each node. ndb [23] leverages
the OpenFlow architecture to provide debugging primitives to software in
Software-Defined Networks. Our work complements these techniques by in-
troducing interactive debugging primitives targeting large-scale distributed
software and enabling deterministic network execution.
Tracking causal paths: To preserve causal relationships between events
and to implement the backtrace primitive, our design tracks the causal paths
by instrumenting the applications and annotating the messages. Magpie [56],
Pinpoint [57], Pip [49], and X-Trace [58] build the causal paths by instru-
menting the applications as well as the operating systems. Causeway [59]
does so by annotating messages across FreeBSD. Quanto [60] extends these
mechanisms to track network-wide energy usage in embedded systems.
Distributed snapshot: To implement the backtrace primitive, we extend
our lockstep algorithm to achieve distributed snapshots. Koo and Toueg
present a coordinated checkpointing algorithm [61]. Several works have fo-
cused on reducing the overhead of the checkpointing process [62]. Chandy
and Lamport [40] introduce the first non-blocking algorithm for distributed
checkpointing. Silvas [63] also describe a non-blocking distributed snapshot
algorithm.
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Chapter 3
Deterministic Network Execution of Control
Traffic
Large-scale networks such as enterprise and ISP networks consist of a com-
plex intertwining of systems and protocol implementations distributed over
wide distances. At the basis of these networks lies the control traffic that
is responsible for controlling and managing data flows of distributed soft-
ware. Examples of control traffic include control-plane software XORP [25]
and Quagga [26], which establish routes for network flows, and distributed
services Chord [30] and Chubby [31], which manage keys and locks for dis-
tributed processes. Like other complex software systems, control-traffic soft-
ware (distributed software that generates control traffic) is prone to defects
or bugs introduced through human error. Indeed, studies have shown that
control traffic accounts for 95 – 99% of the observed bugs in networks [64].
Control traffic typically consists of a sequence of small messages exchanged
between participating nodes. The sequences of messages is usually broadcast
to all the control-traffic software components (e.g., control-plane software) or
formed distinct phases of a complete protocol (e.g., distributed key and lock
services). The most important performance metric of control traffic is the
convergence time. For example, for control-plane software, we would like to
reduce the amount of time that a topology change is broadcast to the entire
network. Similarly, for distributed key and lock services, we would like to
reduce the amount of time between that a client makes a request to that
the request is fulfilled or declined. Unfortunately, this performance metric is
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challenging to maintain in a network architecture supporting deterministic
network execution.
A naive network architecture can enable deterministic network execution
by adopting a lockstep algorithm. To implement a lockstep algorithm, the
architecture needs to set up a layer between the distributed software and the
operating system to intercept message and timer events. Then, it needs to
virtually break the network execution in steps. In each step, every compo-
nent of the distributed software fires timers deterministically, and only allows
a message to travel a single hop in the network. When ordering these events
deterministically, this naive lockstep algorithm ensures that the distributed
software can execute deterministically. However, the performance of the dis-
tributed software can suffer tremendously, since each step requires synchro-
nization among distributed components. More specifically, for control-plane
software, when an update is broadcast to the network, it will be delayed hop
by hop. Similarly, for distributed key and lock services, when a client sends a
request, the sequence of exchanged messages will be delayed phase by phase.
All these scenarios result in significant increase in convergence time.
To address this challenge, we design a new system, DEFINED that en-
ables deterministic network execution in modern wide-area production net-
work without introduce significant performance overhead. We approach the
problem by designing an algorithm leveraging speculative execution. More
specifically, each distributed software component uses a predetermined func-
tion to order message and timer event. If an event doesn’t occur according
to the predetermined ordering function, then DEFINED rolls back the state
of the distribute software component, and replay the events in the “correct”
order. Since rolling back the state of a component is a heavy-weight opera-
tion, we further design a novel ordering function that takes into account the
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locality information and the control-traffic characteristics to reduce the num-
ber of rollbacks. In this way, DEFINED can efficiently provide deterministic
network execution to control traffic.
Deterministic execution [18, 28, 44] has been widely applied in non-control-
traffic software to ease interactive debugging. These techniques, however, to
our best knowledge, cannot operate efficiently and effectively with control-
traffic software. Our system, DEFINED, is a debugger for control-traffic
software that addresses the problem of interactive debugging in modern
wide-area networks. To demonstrate the utility of DEFINED in assisting
troubleshooters analyzing ordering and timing bugs, we use DEFINED to
reproduce the discovery of known bugs in two popular open-source control-
plane implementations, XORP and Quagga. Our evaluation on Emulab [65]
with Rocketfuel topologies [66] and Tier-1 ISP traces shows that very little
overhead is required to make production networks deterministic.
Roadmap: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1
describes the speculative execution algorithms as well as the ordering function
used in DEFINED. Then, Section 3.2 demonstrates our implementation of
DEFINED and details the implementation challenges. Section 3.3 shows the
utility of the system by reproduce the discovery of the two bugs described in
Section 1.1. Section 3.4 evaluates DEFINED on Emulab [65] with Rocketfuel
topologies [66] and Tier-1 ISP traces. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes the
chapter.
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3.1 System Design
In this section, we describe the details of the design of DEFINED. We first
give an overview of the system (Section 3.1.1). Then, we describe DEFINED
(Section 3.1.2), which instruments a production network to make its execu-
tion deterministic. We then conclude the section by discussing some limita-
tions of our design (Section 3.1.3). To keep the description concise, in this
section, we focus on how our system ensures deterministic message events,
and in Section 3.2, we will describe how DEFINED can be extended to pro-
vide deterministic timer events.
3.1.1 Interactive Network Testing and Debugging of
Control-Traffic Software
We first clarify the benefits of a tool for interactive control-traffic software
testing and debugging. Under our design, control-traffic software runs on
top of DEFINED, a user-space substrate, instead of directly on an operat-
ing system. Complementing existing log-based systems [21, 22, 23, 24] that
passively record software activities, we instrument control-traffic software in
a production network and actively manipulate ordering and timing of inter-
nal message receptions. The manipulation ensures network-wide execution
is deterministic. When human troubleshooters observe any control-traffic
software bug in a production network, they can reproduce the bug determin-
istically in a testing and debugging network with only partial recordings, and
analyze it through the debugging coordinator with the interactive stepping
functionality.
Our design, DEFINED, makes control-traffic execution deterministic by
masking internal nondeterminism.
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Testing and debugging a control-traffic system becomes much easier if the
operation of that system is deterministic. Unfortunately, existing control-
traffic software incorporates a high degree of internal randomness in its ex-
ecution, arising from varying message orderings, delay and jitter, and other
variables arising from distributed execution. To address this, our design ma-
nipulates the operation of a production network itself, to remove all internal
nondeterminism and cause it to run in a deterministic manner.
Each node intercepts message and timer events before delivering them to
the control-traffic software, and then uses a pseudorandom ordering function
to determine the exact orderings and timings at which to send the events up
to the software. Instead of adopting a stop-and-wait design [43], we employ
speculative execution to reduce overheads: upon each event occurrence, a
node uses its pseudorandom ordering function to check whether the order
in which the events appeared so far follows the computed pseudorandom se-
quence. If the order is the same as the pseudorandom sequence, the node
delivers the event to the control-traffic software. On the other hand, if the
order is different from the pseudorandom sequence, the network is “rolled
back” to an earlier state, and played forward with the correct ordering. To
further optimize the performance, we construct the pseudorandom ordering
function according to the network topology, so that the computed pseudo-
random sequence matches the event sequence that most frequently occurs.
Consequently, the number of rollbacks is minimized.
3.1.2 Interfacing with Production Networks
To remove internal nondeterminism from a production network, DEFINED
uses speculative execution to ensure determinism while not significantly slow-
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Input: A received message msg.
Result: The message msg is delivered to the target application; the
application is rolled back if necessary.
1 history.insert(msg);
2 history.pseudorandom sort();
3 if history.tail() = msg then // if msg is received in the
‘‘correct’’ order
4 deliver to application(msg);
5 else // if msg is received in the ‘‘incorrect’’ order
6 rollback(msg);
7 end
Algorithm 1: rollback recv(msg)
Input: An “incorrectly” ordered message msg.
Result: The application is rolled back, and then the messages are
delivered to the application in the “correct” order.
1 last in-order msg ← history.find(msg).previous();
// restore the state to when the last in-order message was
received
2 restore application state(last in-order msg);
3 for pmsg ← history.find(msg) to history.tail() do
4 cascading cleanup(pmsg);
5 deliver to application(pmsg);
6 end
Algorithm 2: rollback(msg)
ing down network execution. It does this by speculatively letting messages
be sent to the software in the order in which they are received. To make
sure the ordering can be reproduced, nodes in the network locally compute a
pseudorandom ordering over these messages (Algorithm 1), and if messages
do not arrive in the computed pseudorandom order, the node is rolled back
to the point at which the first message arrived out of sequence, and mes-
sages are then played back in the correct order (Algorithm 2). Rolling back
slows down processing, but with appropriate selection of the pseudorandom
sequence, we can make rolling back rare. In particular, we design an opti-
mized pseudorandom sequence to match the common-case ordering of events
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we would expect to see in the production network. Overall, we need to solve
two problems:
1. We need to come up with a pseudorandom ordering that matches the
common-case ordering of events.
2. We need to perform the rollback when the predicted ordering is vio-
lated.
Computing a message ordering: There are many ways to compute the
pseudorandom ordering, for example using straightforward hashing and per-
mutation. However, to ensure correctness, the pseudorandom ordering needs
to maintain causal relationships between messages. In addition, every time
the pseudorandom ordering diverges from the production network operation,
DEFINED requires a rollback. Hence, for efficiency reasons, we would like
a pseudorandom ordering function that minimizes the number of rollbacks
that are needed.
To do this, we construct an ordering function that reflects the expected
ordering of message arrivals. The function takes as input a set of messages
{m1,m2, . . . ,mk} received at a node n, where each message mi is annotated
with three fields:
1. ni, the identifier of the originating node that generated the first message
of the causal chain.
2. si, a strictly increasing sequence number assigned by the originating
node.
3. di, a deterministic estimate of the delay from the originating node ni
to the local node n.
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W Z
X
Y
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da = lwx
mb
mc
db = da + lxz = lwx + lxz
dc = db + lzy = lwx + lxz + lzy
Figure 3.1: Example: calculating di.
To clarify the meaning of each field, Figure 3.1 illustrates how DEFINED
calculates ni, si, and di for three causally related messages. For each link
(ni, nj), DEFINED measures the average link delay lij before launching the
control-traffic software. When a node generates a message due to external
events (e.g., a withdraw message when a link goes down), it is called the
originating node of the message. The node annotates the message with ni
equal to its id, si equal to the current value of a strictly increasing counter,
and di equal to the average link delay of the outgoing link. On the other hand,
assume a node generates a message mi due to another internal message mj
(e.g., a route update when receiving a message from another node in the
system), where mj is annotated with nj, sj, and dj. The node annotates
message mi with ni equal to nj, si equal to sj, and di equal to dj plus
the average link delay of the outgoing link. In the figure, we assume ma is
generated due to external events, while mb is generated due to ma, and mc
is generated due to mb. Then, all messages have the same originating node
W and sequence number. In addition, da equal to lwx, and db and dc are
calculated by increasing da and db by lxz and lzy, respectively. We use di
to retain causal relationships by never rolling back messages with lesser di
values. Therefore, to retain causal relationships for a message with multiple
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causal parents, we only need to record the largest di value among all its
parents.
When receiving messages from others, a node uses the ordering function
to first sort the messages by di values. It then sorts messages with identical
di values by their ni values, and messages with identical ni values with their
si values. We sort messages by di before si, since for control-traffic software,
messages originating from a node can take different paths. The resulting
function has three key properties:
1. It is deterministic, as it will always compute the same outputs given
the same external events.
2. It is consistent, as it retains causal relationships between messages.
3. It is closely matched to the common-case ordering when originating
nodes send out messages at roughly the same time, since di indicates
the average arrival time of a message.
To further avoid long chains of rollbacks, DEFINED makes sure the or-
dering function is applied independently to messages originated at roughly
the same time. To do this, we divide time into distinct steps, group external
events appearing in a single timestep together, and then independently im-
pose the ordering function mentioned above on the messages corresponding
to each timestep. We further bound the length of each causal chain within
a timestep: messages over this bound are assigned to the next timestep. All
messages in a single timestep correspond to a single group. Each group is
associated with a distinct group number. One node is selected to periodically
broadcast special packets called beacons which specify the group numbers
to be used by the rest of the nodes in the network. (Leader election al-
gorithms [41, 67] are used to make sure the system can tolerate failures.)
34
Group numbers are strictly increasing. Messages triggered by an external
event are tagged with the current group number, while output messages gen-
erated due to an internal message are assigned the same group number as
the internal message. Note that a large variation in distances from nodes to
the beacon source may cause unnecessary rollbacks. We can address this by
dividing the network into smaller subnetworks, and applying DEFINED to
each subnetwork independently.
In our implementation, we assign fixed values of di based on average link
delay between nodes rather than dynamically estimating it. However, if
desired, the link delay values may be periodically re-estimated, as long as
they are applied and recorded at group boundaries.
Detecting if a rollback is necessary: Each node maintains a sliding
window history of messages it received since the last group number update,
as well as a list of messages it sent since the last group number update. The
history is sorted by the ordering function. An entry in the history can be
removed after all messages that might be ordered before it have arrived. De-
pending on the node performance, our experience shows that in a modern
production network, we can generally remove an entry after two times the
maximum propagation time across the network. (We only need an upper
bound of the maximum propagation time. In our implementation, we es-
timate this bound with the sum of the average propagation time and four
times its standard deviation.) Whenever a node receives a new message, it
passes the contents of this window to the ordering function to determine if
the new message has arrived in the correct pseudorandom sequence.
If the message is received in the correct order, it is sent to the software.
Otherwise, the node must roll back the node’s state to the first point where
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Arrival order:  mb md mc ma
Computed order:  mb ma md mc
timeRollback set
Figure 3.2: Example: detecting and performing rollback. In this example,
we assume all messages originate from node W , and all links have the same
expected delay. Thus, the order of the messages are determined by the
sequence numbers. We assume messages mb, ma, md, and mc have sequence
numbers 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
the sequences diverge and replay received messages in the correct order.
There are two scenarios in which a node needs to roll back its state:
1. When receiving messages that have earlier group numbers.
2. When receiving messages that have the current group number, but
don’t arrive in the correct pseudorandom sequence.
For example in Figure 3.2, if node Z receives messages in the order of
{mb,md,mc,ma} (message mb received first), but upon receiving ma it com-
putes the sequence {mb,ma,md,mc}, it would need to roll back to the point
just before it received message md (i.e., it would need to roll back messages
md and mc). Note the pseudorandom ordering is computed on every mes-
sage arrival, for example, here, the node would compute {mb} after receiving
message mb, then compute {mb,md} after receiving message md, then com-
pute {mb,md,mc} after receiving message mc, but then compute the final
sequence {mb,ma,md,mc} after receiving ma.
Performing the rollback: Finally, performing a rollback at a node may
require “unsending” messages previously sent by it to its neighbors. To do
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T
Figure 3.3: Example: rolling back across nodes.
this, the node keeps a history of previous messages sent within the last few
group intervals. On rolling back, the node informs neighbors of the range
of messages that should be rolled back. In the example in Figure 3.3, node
Z had previously sent node V messages {mb,md,mc}. On performing the
rollback to before receiving md, node Z tells node V to roll back the messages
md and mc, and then sends messages {ma,md,mc} in the correct order.
This process continues downstream: since node V had previously forwarded
messages {md,mc}, it must instruct node U and node T to roll them back
as well. Messages at node S are rolled back in a similar manner.
To roll back misordered messages, we restore the state of the control-traffic
software, and if required, inform neighbors about such a rollback to ensure
that all messages that are causally related to the rolled back messages are
themselves rolled back.
3.1.3 Limitations
Supporting incremental deployment: DEFINED assumes control over
all devices that need to be debugged. For example, when using our design
to debug an Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) network, all OSPF-speaking
routers should be instrumented with DEFINED. This may pose a challenge
in environments in which the network operator can only instrument subsets
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the network, or needs to interface with adjacent networks not under the
operator’s control. Similar issues can also occur between the interactions of
control plane and data plane, e.g., external rollbacks might be required when
the control-traffic software attempts to modify the data-plane forwarding
table. To deal with these situations, DEFINED records inputs at interfaces
with external systems. Our system can then replay these partial recordings
at a later point in time to reproduce execution. In addition, we can avoid
external rollbacks by employing buffers at border nodes as proposed in earlier
work [42].
Inferring causality in closed-source software: Another assumption of
our design is that the source code of the software is available, as our design
requires the ability to infer causal relationships between incoming messages
and outgoing ones. Despite this assumption, DEFINED is still highly useful
for control-traffic software developers as we will demonstrate with case studies
in Section 3.3. In fact, it took a graduate student only one day to instrument
the control-traffic software in these case studies. In addition, if developers are
willing to incorporate DEFINED in their software, their customers can still
experience the benefits of deterministic network execution even when the
shipped software is closed-source. Moreover, work on tracing information
flow through application binaries [68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74] can help enable
our design directly on closed-source software.
Imposing determinism on a single node: To provide deterministic net-
work execution, DEFINED also needs to eliminate internal nondeterminism
triggered by events on a local node (e.g., thread scheduling, memory reorder-
ing). In Section 3.3, we describe a specific implementation that removes
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internal nondeterminism triggered by local events from XORP and Quagga.
Fortunately, existing works [18, 47, 75] provide more general solutions to
this problem, and DEFINED can be combined with these works to ensure
determinism of general control-traffic software.
3.2 Implementation
To simplify deployment and operate with existing software bases, we imple-
ment DEFINED as a user-space “shim layer” in the form of a library con-
sisting of function wrappers to intercept message sending, message receiving,
and timer calls.
Our implementation addresses three key challenges:
Providing interfaces to mark causal relationships: As discussed in
Section 3.1.2, DEFINED must determine which messages sent by the control-
traffic software are causally related to messages that are received by the soft-
ware. This information is used to determine which messages need to be
“unsent” when the pseudorandom sequence is violated. Our implementation
overcomes this challenge by providing interfaces for developers to tag a mes-
sage with a unique identifier when it is originated, and extract the identifier
from the message when it is received. With our design in Section 3.1.2, devel-
opers only need to mark “immediate” causal relationships between messages
(causal relationships of messages that are triggered by the same external
event). Then, DEFINED will use these immediate relationships to generate
the correct annotated fields and sort messages in the correct order. When
instrumenting XORP and Quagga, we track all immediate causal relation-
ships by passing the identifier of an incoming message from message receiving
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functions, to message processing functions, and finally, to message sending
functions. This is done by instrumenting these message related functions in
the application software with an extra parameter.
Rolling back: After obtaining a pseudorandom ordering, a node needs to
rollback the state of the software when the ordering is violated. To do this,
nodes perform three steps:
1. Checkpoint states between message receipts.
2. Restore a particular state.
3. Play back messages in the given pseudorandom ordering.
To accomplish these steps, DEFINED employs the fork() system call.
When a message is received, the node inserts the message into the history as
described in Section 3.1.2 and, at the same time, checks if the pseudorandom
ordering is violated. If the message arrival complies with the ordering, the
node invokes the fork() system call. Then, a piece of shared memory is
established between the parent and child processes for notifications of possible
rollbacks. If the received message violates the ordering, the node uses the
shared memory to instruct the process ID it wishes to roll back to. As
discussed in previous literature [76, 77, 78], a normal fork() is not sufficient
to ensure determinism. Specifically, DEFINED also saves the state of any
open files and pending signals, and manipulates process and thread IDs.
After restoring its state, the node plays back the received messages according
to the pseudorandom ordering.
While using fork() may seem somewhat heavyweight, we found its over-
head to be low enough in our implementation that pursuing other techniques
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did not seem necessary for common environments (modern OSs use copy-
on-write to reduce overheads). If desired, the overhead of rollback may be
reduced further, for example by only calling fork() for every several mes-
sages, and rolling back to the last fork() before the sequences diverge, or by
using standard application-specific checkpointing techniques (we investigate
some optimizations in Section 3.4).
Dealing with timers: The mechanisms described above are sufficient to
reproduce message events. However, to reproduce timer events in our design,
we need to ensure the rate at which the process perceives time as progressing
is the same, every time the system is run. To do this we run control-traffic
software in virtual time: instead of triggering timers with the system clock,
we make timers expire according to a counter that advances deterministi-
cally with respect to the message events. This enables timer events to be
reproduced in our system. However, we would like to ensure that we do not
substantially change behavior of the protocol when doing this. For example,
consider the flap damping algorithm in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [79],
which “holds down” unstable routes for a certain period of time. When we
run flap damping in virtual time, we would like BGP to hold down routes for
a similar amount of time, to avoid making the network less or more stable.
To achieve this, we use a virtual time that is deterministically reproducible,
yet progresses at a rate similar to “real” wall-clock time. We do this by using
a deterministic counter for virtual time that is advanced on receipt of every
beacon message, with the rate of advancement between beacons equal to the
configured beacon inter-arrival time. In our implementation, we broadcast
one beacon message every 250 ms, corresponding to one unit of virtual time.
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3.3 Case Studies
To demonstrate the practicality of DEFINED, we instrument the BGP mod-
ule in XORP 0.4 and the Routing Information Protocol (RIP) module in
Quagga 0.96.5 with our system. We use DEFINED to reproduce discovery of
the two known bugs introduced in Section 1.1: an ordering bug in the BGP
path selection process and a timing bug in the RIP timer refresh procedure.
These case studies demonstrate how an operator might utilize DEFINED
to troubleshoot control-traffic bugs after observing erroneous behaviors. We
then conclude this section with a discussion of our experience.
Ordering bug in XORP BGP path selection: To address this bug, we
use DEFINED to troubleshoot this XORP bug. We first use six machines to
emulate the network depicted in Figure 1.1 and load them with the version of
XORP containing the bug. We intercept nondeterministic system calls from
XORP to remove internal nondeterminism triggered by local events. We then
run the production network until the bug occurs. During the process, we are
only required to enable partial recordings of external events at R1 and R2
but not recordings of internal events. Upon identifying the bug, we then
activate DEFINED in the testing and debugging network. Since our system
ensures that execution of both these networks match precisely, when we re-
play the logged external events and run the testing and debugging network,
the bug immediately occurs. We then use DEFINED to find the exact point
at which XORP begins behaving incorrectly. After understanding the bug,
we implement a patch for XORP and validate it in the testing and debugging
network. Finally, we install the patch in the production network. Determin-
istic execution again guarantees that all workarounds we create in the testing
and debugging network will behave the same way in the production network.
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Timing bug in Quagga RIP timer refresh: We use four machines to
emulate the network in Figure 1.2 and load them with the version of Quagga
containing the bug. Fortunately, the same approach we used to troubleshoot
the BGP path selection bug can address the RIP timer refresh bug, since
timing events were also triggered deterministically in networks instrumented
by DEFINED. As a result, during the testing and debugging process, timers
will not go off unexpectedly even when we step through the network execution
at different paces.
Discussion: As shown in these case studies, DEFINED actively manipu-
lates the ordering and timing of internal network events, and it makes control-
traffic software easier to test and debug. Another property that comes with
the active manipulation, however, is that some network execution paths will
never occur, and hence, some bugs will never appear in an instrumented
network. For example, as we were debugging the XORP bug, we noticed
that if the ordering function in DEFINED sorted the paths in the order of
p1, p2, and p3, the bug would not happen in the production network nor
in the testing and debugging network. This property, though, still protects
instrumented networks from the bug, since the deterministic network exe-
cution guarantees that the bug will never appear. On the other hand, it is
possible that DEFINED avoids some network execution paths with partic-
ular performance characteristics. In this case, an operator can modify the
ordering function to force such paths to occur, potentially trading perfor-
mance for more rollbacks. Nevertheless, a troubleshooter may choose to not
instrument the production network with DEFINED, but to still leverage it
in the testing and debugging network. Fortunately, we can apply different
ordering functions in DEFINED, and then we will be able to examine all
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possible execution paths in the testing and debugging network.
3.4 Evaluation
While DEFINED simplifies the task of control-traffic testing and debugging,
it comes with several costs. In order to measure this overhead, we leverage
Emulab [65] and take a two-pronged approach. First, to evaluate the per-
formance of DEFINED in a practical setting, we perform experiments using
topologies from Rocketfuel [66] and traces from a Tier-1 ISP (Section 3.4.2).
Then, to study scalability of our system, we present results under a wide
range of topologies and workloads (Section 3.4.3).
3.4.1 Methodology
We first give an overview of our experimental approach:
Topologies and traces: To improve the realism of our evaluation, we
leverage topologies measured with Rocketfuel and OSPF traces collected at a
Tier-1 ISP network. We use PoP-level topologies from Rocketfuel including
Sprintlink (43 nodes), Ebone (25 nodes), and Level3 (52 nodes). (Results
from these topologies are similar, so we only present Sprintlink results due to
space constraints.) Then, the OSPF traces are collected from a Tier-1 ISP
area 0 network consisting of 324 nodes during a 2 week period (November 1st
to 14th, 2009), resulting in 651 OSPF network events. We post-process these
traces to reproduce the network dynamics over time, and then replay this
workload in our experiments by randomly mapping events onto Rocketfuel
topologies. Finally, to investigate the performance of DEFINED at scale, and
over a wider range of topologies, we consider synthetic graphs constructed
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by the BRITE topology generator [80, 81]. Overall, we focus most of our
experiments on intra-domain routing as opposed to inter-domain routing,
as the lower propagation delays and tighter requirements on fast reaction
make our overheads more visible. Unless otherwise specified, we run our
implementation with the XORP OSPF router daemon, version 1.6.
Metrics: As DEFINED instruments a production network, we measure its
control, delay, and memory overheads.
3.4.2 Performance
To characterize the performance overheads of DEFINED, we replay network
traces against our implementation deployed on Emulab. We evaluate the
design on several scales. First, we collect network-level results on our imple-
mentation in the Rocketfuel Sprintlink topology. We then gather node-level
microbenchmarks to uncover the sources of bottlenecks in our implementa-
tion.
Network-wide experiments: First, we replay the Tier-1 ISP workload
against our XORP-based implementation and measure the control overhead
per node, for each event in the trace. Figure 3.4 shows that a small number
of nodes experience more control overhead than others, as the rollback pro-
cedure requires additional control packets to be exchanged between nodes.
Fortunately, in all cases, the percentage of these nodes is less than 1%.
Then, we measure the time for the network to converge (the time from
when a failure is detected, to when all nodes are updated with their correct
routing state). To stress our design, we reduce XORP’s hello and retransmit
intervals to be as small as possible (1 second). We compare against an un-
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Figure 3.4: Network-level results of Sprintlink topology with Tier-1 OSPF
traces: control message overheads of DEFINED.
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Figure 3.5: Network-level results of Sprintlink topology with Tier-1 OSPF
traces: delay of DEFINED.
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Figure 3.6: Node-level results of Sprintlink topology with Tier-1 OSPF
traces: rollback overhead of DEFINED.
modified XORP implementation. We found no statistically significant differ-
ence between the two. However, to improve stability, XORP’s default OSPF
configuration introduces a 1-second delay between when routing messages are
received and when they are propagated on (due to the retransmit timer). To
investigate whether this delay was the reason why our performance overheads
could not be seen, we modified the XORP code to eliminate this 1-second
delay. After doing this, the delays became more apparent: Figure 3.5 shows
the network-wide convergence time is still close between the two, but our
implementation has additional delay in a small number of cases, resulting in
a longer tail. In addition, this figure also demonstrates that our technique
in imposing local determinism on control-traffic software (Section 3.3) has
negligible overhead.
Single-node experiments: To investigate the source of the tail, we in-
strumented a single node of our implementation to collect microbenchmarks.
We compare XORP running under DEFINED with an unmodified instance
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of XORP. In particular, we measure the amount of time required to perform a
rollback (Figure 3.6), as well as the time required to process packets without
rollbacks (Figure 3.7). We found that rollback code was triggered rarely, but,
as expected, when it was triggered, it introduced overhead. To reduce the
rollback overhead, instead of using fork() calls as described in Section 3.2
(FK), we manually intercepted memory writes (MI) using /proc/<pid>/mem
to directly access the memory of the process to emulate application-specific
memory management, and measured the overhead to only copy changed bytes
between the processes. (We use this optimization to identify the optimal
bound of rollbacks. It is not necessary for a system to do so to adopt DE-
FINED.) With this optimization, the median overhead for rollback is reduced
to around 0.6 ms (Figure 3.6), making non-rollback overhead the bottleneck.
The variance observed in this figure comes from the variance of fork() calls
and the number of events to be rolled back. Note that even the unoptimized
implementation of rolling back may be tolerable for certain protocols, e.g.,
BGP uses the MRAI timer to intentionally slow convergence for scalability
purposes. (The MRAI timer determines the minimum time between adver-
tisements of routes to a particular destination from a single BGP device.)
To reduce the non-rollback overhead, we investigate two optimizations.
First, we try pre-forking (PF): instead of performing the fork when the new
packet arrives (TF), we perform the fork after the packet is processed (to
prepare for the next packet). This causes forking to be performed during
idle cycles. However, this does not completely remove the forking overhead,
as due to copy-on-write, the memory copy associated with the fork is still
delayed until the next packet is received. Hence, as a heuristic, we overload
malloc() to manually touch memory (TM) on the heap when performing
the pre-fork. This improves performance further (Figure 3.7).
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Figure 3.7: Node-level results of Sprintlink topology with Tier-1 OSPF
traces: non-rollback overhead of DEFINED.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  100  200  300  400  500
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
Fr
ac
tio
n
Memory [MB]
XORP
DEFINED(PM)
DEFINED(VM)
Figure 3.8: Node-level results of Sprintlink topology with Tier-1 OSPF
traces: memory overhead of DEFINED.
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Finally, to achieve its benefits, our approach also incurs some additional
memory overhead. Figure 3.8 shows the amount of virtual memory allocated
to each process (VM). We find it increases linearly with the number of forked
processes. However, some of this memory is not instantiated in practice due
to page sharing. To measure the precise amount of physical memory allo-
cated, we monitor memory writes in /proc/<pid>/mem in Linux (PM), and
plot the memory actually instantiated by the process. Since these processes
share the vast majority of memory contents, the amount of memory inflation
is small (less than 2% during the entire run).
3.4.3 Scalability
To investigate the performance of DEFINED at scale, and over a wide variety
of workloads, we leverage BRITE topologies and synthetic events to investi-
gate the sensitivity of our results to network size and event rate. (Based on
the nature of the bug, testing and debugging can become difficult extremely
fast as the network size increases. For nondeterministic bugs, a dozen nodes
can already make testing and debugging difficult.)
Control overhead: We first measure the control overhead with BRITE
topologies of varying sizes (Figure 3.9). We found that the delay-sensitive
pseudorandom ordering optimization described in Section 3.1.2 (OO) signif-
icantly reduces the number of rollbacks (and hence message overhead) of
DEFINED compared to random orderings (RO). Regardless of the network
size, each node only needs to process at most 2 additional packets on aver-
age when using the optimized ordering (compared to the unmodified XORP
instance).
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Figure 3.11: Scalability over network size: memory of DEFINED.
Delay overhead: Figure 3.10 shows the network-wide convergence time
of DEFINED compared to the unmodified XORP instance. Overall, we find
that while DEFINED has a longer tail in its convergence time distribution
(Figure 3.5), the average convergence time between the two instances is com-
parable. In addition, the optimized ordering (OO) again outperforms random
orderings (RO).
Memory requirements: We then measure how the memory requirements
scale over network size. Due to the use of group numbers as described in Sec-
tion 3.1.2, DEFINED can consistently maintain a manageable size of memory
usage. Figure 3.11 shows that the amount of memory required at nodes stays
stable with different network sizes, and can easily fit in the megabytes or gi-
gabytes of DRAM available in modern routers.
Event rates: Finally, to investigate how DEFINED scales with event rates,
we vary the number of events per second and measure the convergence time.
Figure 3.12 illustrates that the convergence time increases slowly as the num-
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Figure 3.12: Scalability over event rate: convergence time of DEFINED.
ber of events per second increases, and the average convergence time is only a
little bit over 2 seconds when there are 10 events per second. This event rate
can easily cover all scenarios we observe in the Tier-1 traces. Nevertheless,
when dealing with a higher rate of events, DEFINED can decrease its beacon
intervals to reduce the number of rollbacks and provide better scalability (as
described in Section 3.1.2).
3.4.4 Simulation Results
To further investigate performance of the algorithm at scale, and over a
wider variety of workloads, we leverage simulations. We investigate the delay,
control overhead, and memory overheads of our design when run on the Tier-
1 network topology and workloads.
Control overhead: Figure 3.13 plots control overhead per node, for each
event in the trace. Here, we find that some nodes experience more control
overhead than others, as the rollback procedure requires additional control
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Figure 3.13: Simulations, Tier-1 network: message overheads.
packets to be exchanged between nodes. However, in the average case, the
amount of control overhead is inflated by less than 20%.
Storage requirements: DEFINED requires additional state to be kept
at routers, for the history of received packets needed for rollback. We found
that the storage requirements are small and increase slowly with network
size, and would easily fit in the megabytes or gigabytes of DRAM available
in modern routers. A secondary benefit of our design is in reducing log sizes,
by a factor of 480 to 3000.
Delay overhead: Figure 3.14 shows the convergence time of the network
for DEFINED, comparing with plain OSPF as a baseline. Here, we run
the entire 2-week Tier-1 ISP trace and measure the amount of time for the
network to converge after each event. Overall, we find that while DEFINED
increases convergence time of the network, the convergence time between the
two approaches is comparable.
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Figure 3.14: Simulations, Tier-1 network: delay.
3.5 Summary
The high complexity of large-scale networks coupled with the rich variety
of faults they undergo will require humans to be “in-the-loop” to diagnose
complex problems for the foreseeable future. To address this, we proposed
techniques for interactive testing and debugging of control-traffic software.
We specifically addressed two key challenges, namely, deterministic network
execution and interactive stepping. Our solution draws from previous work
and also proposes new algorithms. We validated our work through a user-
space “shim-layer” implementation and extensive evaluation using topologies
from Rocketfuel and traces from a Tier-1 ISP. Our results show the practical
feasibility and scalability of our approach. Specifically, we leveraged our
system to reproduce discovery of known bugs in XORP and Quagga, and
showed its benefits over the common testing and debugging method that
uses partial recordings and GDB.
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Chapter 4
Deterministic Network Execution of Data
Traffic
Web, peer-to-peer, FTP, and streaming protocols have become the major
traffic sources of today’s Internet. Indeed, these protocols account more
than 60% of the classified Internet traffic [82, 83]. Most of these protocols are
running on end hosts, and generate data traffic to transfer data information
from one host to another. Examples of software that generates data traffic
include web services [36], which transfer web pages, images, and other objects
from web servers to web clients, and peer-to-peer file services [37], which send
parts of files from one participating host to another. Since the data-traffic
software (distributed software that generates data traffic) produces the major
portion of the Internet traffic, its efficiency and reliability directly impacts
the stability of the Internet. Unfortunately, this kind of software has always
been the major source of defects and bugs [84].
Data traffic typically consists of a series of messages from one host to
another. These series of messages usually carry the data information from
a server host to a single client host, and the number of bytes transferred in
each flow is often greater than that in control traffic. The most important
performance metric of data traffic is the turnaround time. For example,
for web services, we would like to reduce the amount of time between that
the client sends a request to that the requested web page is rendered on
the client’s screen. Similarly, for peer-to-peer file services, we would like to
reduce the amount of time between that the client request a block of data to
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that the requested block is transferred and stored on the client’s disks. Not
only does this performance metric requirement make constructing a testing
and debugging architecture challenging, it also forces us to design a different
algorithm than the algorithm for control traffic.
The major issue that prevents us from directly adopting the deterministic
network execution algorithm in Chapter 3 is the elephant flows (a flow whose
rate is larger than 1% of the link utilization [85]). The number of messages for
each data flow varies greatly. However, studies have shown that around 80%
of the bytes in a network are utilized by elephant flows [86]. The algorithm
described in Chapter 3 is able to provide deterministic network execution for
data traffic. Nevertheless, it will not be able to do so efficiently, since the
large number of messages in an elephant flow creates a long causal relation-
ship chain when we use the algorithm. This long causal chain significantly
increases the complexity and execution time of the cascading cleanup routine
in the algorithm. Even with the group number optimization, the number of
messages of an elephant flow in a group can still be large, and will degrade
the performance of data software.
To address this problem and build a testing and debugging architecture
for data traffic, we propose a design that leverages synchronized clocks at
end hosts to coordinate all processes of distributed data software. Each end
host uses a synchronized clock to label messages with timestamps, and then
leverages the timestamps to deterministically deliver messages to a process.
As long as the external events (e.g., user inputs) happen at the same time,
each process will receive messages in deterministic ordering. When coupled
with existing work on deterministic parallel environments [18, 28, 29], our de-
sign further delivers messages to each process in deterministic timing. Since
data traffic involves a series of messages from one host to another, forcing
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deterministic delay to each message only shift the turnaround time by the
forced delay of a single message. Thus, the performance of the data software
in the architecture is bounded by the worst case scenario that the software
faces without our deterministic execution design. In practice, to improve
performance, a threshold can be set for the message delivery time of each
data software instance, so that the completion time can be greatly reduced.
To further study the practicality of our design, we implement our proposed
algorithm in Linux kernel 2.6.32. We employ the Network Time Protocol
(NTP) to synchronize clocks at end hosts across large-scale networks. Then,
we use the netfilter interface [87] to intercept packets at the end hosts and
label them with synchronized timestamps. We further build a novel buffering
mechanism at the end host to guarantee deterministic network execution of
data software. To understand the efficiency of our implementation, we eval-
uate the performance of our design with a popular web server, lighttpd [36].
lighttpd powers several popular websites such as YouTube, wikipedia, and
meebo. Our results show that the average response latency of the web server
with our testing and debugging architecture is within 4% of that of the vanilla
lighttpd.
Roadmap: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, Sec-
tion 4.1 gives an overview of the backgrounds about clock synchronization
and message delivery latency in modern wide-area networks. Section 4.2
presents the design of the algorithms for data traffic in our testing and de-
bugging architecture. Then, Section 4.3 describes our Linux kernel imple-
mentation of the algorithms. Section 4.4 evaluates the design with real-world
data-traffic applications. We conclude this chapter in Section 4.5.
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Figure 4.1: Common time synchronization protocols. These protocols
leverage local timestamps to calculate the offset between local clocks of a
pair of nodes. In this example, the clock offset between n1 and n2 can be
derived with timestamps t0, t1, t2, and t3.
4.1 Backgrounds
When manipulating data traffic, our testing and debugging network archi-
tecture builds upon several distinct distributed protocol and network path
characteristics. In this section, we give an overview of these useful but of-
ten overlooked network facts, which we will later use them to design the
algorithms to support deterministic network execution of data traffic.
Our proposed algorithms depend on the accuracy of synchronized clocks.
Thus, we will discuss the accuracy of different clock synchronization proto-
cols, and we will present results of our study [38] showing that these protocols
can work extremely well in most cases. Then, since our algorithms also de-
pend on the variations of network latency, we will describe the variations of
one-way latencies in real-world networks. Through our experiments, we will
demonstrate that the variations of one-way latencies in modern networks are
small in common scenarios.
59
Synchronized clocks over wide-area networks: Several protocols are
designed to synchronize clocks among end hosts. Two of the most well-known
time synchronization protocols are NTP and Precision Time Protocol (PTP).
Both of these protocols utilize local timestamps to calculate the clock offset
between a pair of nodes. Figure 4.1 gives an example of the execution of these
time synchronization protocols. Each execution of these protocols requires
the following timestamps to derive the clock offset:
1. t0, the initiator’s timestamp of the request packet transmission.
2. t1, the receiver’s timestamp of the request packet reception.
3. t2, the receiver’s timestamp of the response packet transmission.
4. t3, the initiator’s timestamp of the response packet reception.
Then, each of the participating nodes can use these timestamps to calculate
the clock offset between the two nodes as follows:
(t1 − t0) + (t2 − t3)
2
However, this calculation makes a couple assumptions that don’t always
hold:
1. The clock offset remains the same during the execution of the protocol.
2. The transmit delay from n0 to n1 is the same as that from n1 to n0.
Although the first assumption can be resolved by selecting nodes with
small round-trip delay to perform time synchronization, the second assump-
tion is often the culprit of imperfect time synchronization [38]. Fortunately,
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Figure 4.2: Internet2 network latency measured by OWAMP. This figure
shows the one-way latency measurements in a week from different cities to
Chicago. We observe that the variations of one-way latencies are small. Due
to space limitations, we only plot measurements of five network paths, but
measurements from other network paths demonstrate the same behavior.
studies have shown that even with these assumptions, these time synchro-
nization protocols still produce reasonable results. NTP can maintain time
to with tens of milliseconds over the public Internet, and can achieve one-
millisecond accuracy in local area networks [88, 89]. PTP can further pro-
vide sub-microsecond accuracy in local area networks [90]. As shown in
Section 4.4, the accuracy is sufficient for our testing and debugging architec-
ture.
One-way latency variations in production networks: Since our ar-
chitecture utilized algorithms to force deterministic delay on each message,
one-way latency variations have a significant effect on the efficiency of our
design. More specifically, the larger the latency variations, the longer the
buffering time for each message. Thus, to understand the network path
latency variations in the Internet, we use data from the Internet2 infrastruc-
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ture [91]. We collect latency data every minute over an entire week from the
One-Way Ping (OWAMP) project [92], which uses synchronized clocks and
UDP to measure the one-way latency between PoPs. Figure 4.2 shows the
results. (Due to space limitations, we only present the one-way latency data
from five different cities to Chicago. However, measurements of other one-
way paths are similar to the results presented here.) In this figure, we observe
that all the one-way latency measurements of a single path fall in around a
0.5-millisecond range, and the small one-way latency variations ensure that
our testing and debugging architecture can work efficiently.
4.2 System Design
Our goal is to devise a testing and debugging architecture to support effi-
cient deterministic network execution of data software with modifications at
only end hosts, and in this section, we describe our design step by step. In
Section 4.2.1, we first demonstrate the general architecture of the design and
show that it provides deterministic order of message receptions. We then
explain how our design provides deterministic timing of message receptions
in Section 4.2.2 and how our design handles message loss in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Deterministic Message Ordering
To better illustrate the fundamentals of our design, we first assume end hosts
have perfectly synchronized clocks. Furthermore, we assume the network is
perfectly reliable and guarantees bounded transmission latency from one end
host to another. We relax the perfectly synchronized clock assumption later
in the subsection, and removes rest of the assumptions in Section 4.2.3.
Our first goal is to provide deterministic order of message receptions, and
62
Network Software 
Clock 
Log 
Input Output 
Queue 
Figure 4.3: The architectural design at one end host. The output module at
the sending host tags each outgoing message with a timestamp from a
synchronized clock. The receiving end queues all incoming messages, and
the input module delivers them to the data software according to the
timestamp. In addition, the input module logs messages loss.
to achieve this goal, we need to eliminate nondeterminism in network trans-
mission. There are several sources of nondeterminism in network transmis-
sion such as hardware or in-network queuing, and together, they make the
network transmission latency nondeterministic. That is, under different in-
stances, even with the same pair of source and destination, messages can
experience different transmission latencies. When this property combined
with multiple senders or multiple paths, the order of message receptions is
nondeterministic. To eliminate the nondeterminism, our design queues re-
ceived messages at end hosts and deliver them at the latest possible arrival
time of each message.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the design of our novel buffering mechanism. Each
end host has a synchronized clock. At a sending host, the clock is used by the
output module to tag outgoing messages with timestamps indicating sending
times. When a receiving host gets a message, it is first put in a receiving
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queue. Then, since we assume the network has bounded transmission latency
from one end host to another, the input module at the receiving host can use
the source address and the sending timestamp to calculate the latest possible
arrival time of a message. Finally, the input module delivers the message to
the data software at exact the latest possible arrival time.
The design accomplishes two objectives:
1. The architecture eliminates nondeterminism in network transmission,
because all messages are delivered deterministically at the latest possi-
ble arrival time. This property, in turn, guarantees deterministic order
of message receptions.
2. The performance of data software is theoretically bounded by the worst
case scenario without the deterministic execution design, because all
messages deterministically experience the worst case transmission la-
tency.
A simple modification can let the design work without perfectly synchro-
nized clocks: when a receiving host calculates the latest possible arrival time
of a message, it considers not only the worst case transmission latency but
also the worst case clock difference between the two hosts. For example,
assume the transmission time from the sending host to the receiving host
is bounded between [tmin, tmax] and the clock difference of the two hosts is
bound between [cmin, cmax] (cmin can be negative, which means the clock at
the receiving host indicates an earlier time than that at the sending host). We
can always find a positive value c′max such that [cmin, cmax] ⊆ [−c′max, c′max].
When receiving a message with a timestamp t at an end host, the host cal-
culate the latest possible arrival time of the message by adding to t not only
tmax but also c
′
max. This modification works because adding tmax to t ensures
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nondeterminism in network transmission is eliminated and adding c′max to t
guarantees nondeterminism in clock synchronization is removed.
Imperfectly synchronized clocks, however, may have negative impact on
network software, as messages have to be queued for an additional c′max time.
Fortunately, as discussed in Section 4.1, time synchronization protocols are
able to achieve reasonable accuracy in today’s network. For instance, in a
local area network, NTP is able to provide one-millisecond accuracy, and
PTP is even able to provide sub-microsecond accuracy.
4.2.2 Deterministic Message Timing
Although our design so far ensures deterministic order of message receptions,
in practice, it cannot provide deterministic timing of message receptions. The
reason of this incapability is two-fold:
1. Nondeterminism in message delivery: no matter residing in user space
or kernel, the input module needs to spend a nondeterministic amount
of time to deliver messages to network software.
2. Nondeterminism in thread scheduling: even if a message is delivered
to a process in deterministic timing, the process’s threads can only
start processing the message until they are scheduled to run. Such a
schedule can be nondeterministic and results in nondeterministic timing
of message receptions.
To address the first shortcoming, we made use of virtual time in our de-
sign. More specifically, each end host maintains a virtual time counter for
each process and advances the counter based on a deterministic source. Our
design uses the number of instructions a process executed as the determin-
istic source, as such information can be obtained by hardware performance
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counters found in most major processors. Each end host increases the counter
after ni instructions executed, and whenever the process invokes a time re-
lated operation, the value of the virtual time counter is used instead of the
real clock value. In addition, to handle instructions that pause the execution
of a process, each host increases the virtual time counter after a fixed time
δ when encountering these instructions. Finally, to incorporate virtual time
into the design described in Section 4.2.1, we need to relate clock time with
virtual time. In our design, we leverage real-time operating systems such as
RTLinux [93] to enforce each process execute exact ni instructions within a
fixed time δ, so that there is a deterministic way to convert clock time to
real time. Thus, the architecture in Section 4.2.1 can work accordingly.
To address the second shortcoming, we employed existing work on deter-
ministic parallel environments [18, 28, 29]. Note that our design thus far
provides deterministic timing of message receptions for single-threaded pro-
grams. To extend our design for multi-threaded programs, we leverage the
deterministic scheduling given in previous work. In addition, virtual time
counters are maintained for each thread instead of each process.
4.2.3 Deterministic Message Loss
In previous subsections, we assume the network is perfectly reliable and guar-
antees bounded transmission latency from one host to another. The assump-
tion, however, is not realistic in practice, and in this subsection, we describe
how our design handles message loss and unbounded transmission latency in
the real world.
To deal with message loss, our design has to achieve two things:
1. If a message is lost, it is lost every time.
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2. If a message is successfully delivered, it is delivered every time.
To conform to the first condition, we treat message loss as external events
and log them accordingly. To identify which message is lost, a sequence
number is tagged on each message along with the timestamp. At a receiving
end, the host can use sequence numbers and timestamps to log message
loss. During other instances of the deterministic execution, each end host
uses the log to deterministically drop messages. To conform to the second
condition, we leveraged classic distributed algorithms [42] to rollback the
network to an earlier state and retransmit the message. More specifically, if
a receiving end detects unexpected message loss, based on the timestamps
of other messages, the host notifies all other hosts to rollback to a time
prior to the message transmission. Then, the network execution resumes
its deterministic execution. In networks such as enterprise networks where
message loss is rare, the design imposes little overhead.
To deal with unbounded transmission latency, our design allows users to
set a threshold for each end-to-end channel. The threshold is deemed as the
largest possible transmission latency between the two end hosts. If a message
arrives later than the threshold, the receiving host treats the message as
if it was lost. A threshold can also be used to improve performance, for
instance, if the network transmission latency distribution resembles a long-
tailed distribution, the user can set a threshold accordingly to avoid the
extreme worst cases and allow better performance of data software in our
design. Fortunately, as described in Section 4.1, even in the Internet, we can
often expect the transmission latency to fall within a small 0.5-millisecond
range.
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Figure 4.4: The header of our shim-layer implementation. A 32-bit
sequence number and a 64-bit timestamp are tagged to every message to
provide deterministic execution of data software.
4.3 Implementation
To further explore the practicality of our design, we implement the algorithms
in Linux kernel 2.6.32.
We realized our design as a shim layer between the IP layer and the trans-
port layer. One of the reasons that we placed our implementation below the
transport layer was because our design needs to have finer control over mes-
sage loss and unbounded transmission latency, and some transport protocols
such as TCP mask those characteristics.
Figure 4.4 depicts the header of our implementation. We used a 32-bit
sequence number to handle message loss, as the 32-bit field along with the
64-bit timestamp is sufficient to identify every message in today’s networks.
The 64-bit timestamp records wall-clock time with an accuracy of 1 ns.
To insert this shim layer, we use the netfilter interface [87] to intercept and
modify messages.
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When sending a message, getnstimeofday() is used to get a nanosecond
timestamp. We then tagged the message with a sequence number and the
timestamp before delivering it to the other end host.
When receiving a message, we used the timestamp and a predetermined
largest possible transmission latency associate with the sending host to cal-
culate the exact time to deliver the message to the data software. Predeter-
mined largest possible transmission latency is not always necessary, because
we can dynamically estimate and adjust the value, as long as the mecha-
nisms employed are deterministic. After determining the delivery time, we
buffered the message in different ways based on the expected queuing time:
if the queuing time is less than 1 ms, we employed busy-waiting to avoid
unnecessary content switches; if the queuing time is several milliseconds, we
leveraged high-resolution timer to accurately achieve the queuing effect.
The design so far works well for small messages. However, when we use our
implementation to deliver large messages, the additional shim layer cannot
be inserted into a single message due to the Maximum Transmission Unit
(MTU) limitation. Several standards have limited the maximum packet unit
that can be transmitted on the media. For example, Ethernet can only
transmit 1,492 bytes per packet, and FDDI can only transmit 4,352 bytes
per packet. Thus, to be able to insert the additional shim layer, we need
to make sure that the application or other upper-layer protocols don’t put
too many data into a single message. Fortunately, our design located on
the end hosts, and we can modify the message size as soon as a message is
generated. We achieve this by modifying the size parameter in the Linux
network stack to ensure that we have enough space for the shim layer when
a message reaches our implementation. With this modification, our design
can work efficiently with all kinds of data software.
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4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our design with the implementation described in
Section 4.3 using a popular web server, lighttpd, as the data software. In
Section 4.4.1, we detail our evaluation methodology. In Section 4.4.2, we
present and discuss the performance results. In Section 4.4.3, we estimate
the storage requirements for our architecture. In Section 4.4.4, we discuss
the effects of adjusting the transmission latency threshold. New
4.4.1 Methodology
Our implementation brings deterministic network execution of data software
by deterministically deliver messages to the software at the latest possible
arrival time. The extra queuing latency can affect the average performance
of data software. To investigate the extent of this latency overhead, we
employed one of the most heavily used data software, a web server, as the
software to study.
We picked lighttpd [36] as our web server due to its popularity. In addition,
lighttpd is a single-threaded web server, and thus, it allows us to focus on
the overhead imposed by our implementation and remove that induced by
other mechanisms in our design, e.g., the deterministic parallel environments.
Then, we used Apache HTTP server benchmarking tool, ab, as the web client
to measure the response latency of the lighttpd server.
We setup the web server on an Intel Core2 Duo 3.0 GHz machine with 3
GB memory, and the client is run on a similar machine. The server and the
client were connected with a 1 Gbps Ethernet with a worst case round-trip
time around 120 microseconds. Unless stated otherwise, we conservatively
set the largest possible one-way transmission threshold to 200 microseconds
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Figure 4.5: The response latency with different requested page sizes. The
average latencies are within 7% of those incurred by the original web server.
(a worst case round-trip time of 400 microseconds).
Each experiment is performed over 1,000 requests. We present the re-
sults in the form of either averages and standard deviations or cumulative
distribution functions.
4.4.2 Performance
We first evaluated the response latency of the lighttpd web server with dif-
ferent requested page sizes, and the result is shown in Figure 4.5. Note that
the latency presented here is the response latency, which is the duration since
the client sends a request until the client receives the entire web page. As the
requested page size increases, the response time increases accordingly. The
average latencies incurred by our implementation are always within 7% of
those incurred by the original lighttpd. The latency overhead also increases
with the page size, and the maximum, 6.87%, occurring at 100 MB. This in-
creasing trend is because our implementation is placed under the TCP layer.
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Figure 4.6: The CDF of response latency of requesting a median-sized web
page. The average latency is within 4% of that incurred by the original web
server.
TCP transmits a burst of packets only after it receives the acknowledgments
of the previous burst. Our implementation increases the latency between
bursts, and as a result, the larger number of bursts incurred when transmit-
ting a larger page increases the overall response latency. Another observation
to make is that even with our implementation, the results still demonstrate
small, but non-zero standard deviations. This is because we presented our
results with wall-clock time, and as describe in Section 4.2.2, the nondeter-
minism residing outside network transmissions contributes to the standard
deviations.
We then detailed the response latency of the lighttpd web server by pre-
senting the cumulative distribution function of the latency by requesting a
median-sized web page (177.47 KB) as reported in Google’s study [94]. Fig-
ure 4.6 presents the result. The average latencies of the original and the
deterministic web servers are 5.132 ms and 5.329 ms, respectively. The dif-
ference is 3.84% in latency overhead. An interesting observation is that the
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Figure 4.7: The CDF of response latency with different largest possible
one-way transmission latencies. The average latencies are within 1.258 ms
of those incurred by the original web server.
worst case scenarios in both settings are almost the same, which is a di-
rect result of the fact that our design always delivers messages at the latest
possible arrival time.
Finally, to understand the impact of setting the largest possible trans-
mission latency threshold, we adjusted the predetermined one-way latency
threshold and measured the performance of the lighttpd web server. Fig-
ure 4.7 illustrates the result. As expected, the average latency increases as
the threshold increases. Although with the largest threshold presented in the
figure, the average latency overhead increases to 24.51%, the absolute differ-
ence is within 1.258 ms of the original, which can be acceptable for most
data software.
Overall, the results presented here demonstrate that our implementation
provides deterministic execution of data software with reasonable latency
overhead, and our design can be beneficial to data software such as web
servers.
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Receiver
ATL CHI HOU KAN L.A. N.Y.
S
e
n
d
e
r
Atlanta 0 1 5 1 5 0
Chicago 1 0 0 0 0 0
Houston 166 0 0 0 0 172
Kansas 1 0 0 0 0 0
Los Angeles 6 0 0 0 0 5
New York 0 0 5 0 10 0
Table 4.1: Number of lost messages per 1,000,000 messages in the Internet2
network. The cities in the left most column are the senders, while the cities
in the top most row are the receivers.
4.4.3 Storage
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, our testing and debugging architecture records
treat lost messages as external events, and record them accordingly. To
understand the amount of storage needed to record all the lost messages in a
data flow, we use the Internet2 trace to estimate the requirement. Table 4.1
summarizes the result. In this table, we show the number of lost messages
per 1,000,000 transmitted messages. The left most column lists the senders,
and the top most row lists the receivers. We observe less than 0.02% lost
rate in all data flow, which means that when sending a 1 GByte file, we only
need less than 1 MByte storage requirements.
4.4.4 One-Way Latency Threshold
Not only does the latency threshold affect the performance, it also controls
the lost rate of the data flow. To understand how the latency threshold
affects the number of additional lost messages, we evaluate our design with
the Internet2 trace. In the experiments, we set the latency threshold to
the average latency plus 0.5 ms and 5 ms, respectively. Then, we record
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Receiver
ATL CHI HOU KAN L.A. N.Y.
S
e
n
d
e
r
Atlanta 0 0 0 225 1 0
Chicago 0 0 0 289 1 0
Houston 0 0 0 235 1 0
Kansas 166 162 170 0 169 163
Los Angeles 0 0 0 237 0 2
New York 0 0 0 178 0 0
Table 4.2: Number of additional lost messages per 1,000,000 messages in
the Internet2 network when we use set the latency threshold to the average
latency plus 0.5 ms. The cities in the left most column are the senders,
while the cities in the top most row are the receivers.
Receiver
ATL CHI HOU KAN L.A. N.Y.
S
e
n
d
e
r
Atlanta 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chicago 0 0 0 0 0 0
Houston 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kansas 0 0 0 0 70 0
Los Angeles 0 0 0 0 0 0
New York 0 0 0 178 0 0
Table 4.3: Number of additional lost messages per 1,000,000 messages in
the Internet2 network when we use set the latency threshold to the average
latency plus 5 ms. The cities in the left most column are the senders, while
the cities in the top most row are the receivers.
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the number of additional lost messages per 1,000,000 transmitted messages.
Table 4.2 shows the results when we use the average latency plus 0.5 ms as
the threshold. We observe that except for flows involving Kansas, all data
flows have less than five additional lost messages. When we increase the
threshold to the average latency plus 5 ms, Table 4.3 shows that the lost
rate improves dramatically, almost all the data flows have no additional lost
messages.
4.5 Summary
Leveraging synchronized clocks and deterministic parallel environments [18,
28, 29], we propose a testing and debugging architectural design that provides
deterministic network execution of data software by delivering messages to
software at the latest possible arrival time. We demonstrate the practicality
of the design with an implementation in Linux kernel 2.6.32. Our imple-
mentation tags messages with a 12-byte header and supports fine-grained
determinism with an accuracy of nanoseconds. We evaluate our implemen-
tation with a popular web server, lighttpd. Under a conservative setting, our
implementation provides deterministic execution of network software with
less than 4% in latency overhead. Our design and implementation enable
several interesting applications, including detecting and analyzing malicious
software, predicting and avoiding data software failures, and testing and de-
bugging data software.
76
Chapter 5
Debugging Primitives Using Deterministic
Network Execution
When using the algorithms designed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, our pro-
posed testing and debugging architecture is able to enable deterministic net-
work execution for both control and data software. More specifically, when
the network environment is given the same external events in the exact tim-
ing and ordering, our architecture can reproduce the exact network execution
behavior of distributed software. By doing this efficiently and at scale, our
design allows human troubleshooters to examine and analyze the network
execution of control and data software affected by bugs or defects through
inspecting the misbehavior multiple times. In addition, troubleshooters can
also experiment workarounds in a testing and debugging network, and expect
them to provide the same effect in the production network.
Unfortunately, although the current setup allows troubleshooters to repro-
duce the exact network execution of distributed software, it doesn’t allow
human troubleshooters to analyze the execution in details. Since the algo-
rithms described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 work in distributed manners,
there isn’t a straightforward approach to allow troubleshooters to modify the
network execution, e.g., changing the value of a variable on a participating
node during the execution of the distributed software. In addition, there isn’t
any established mechanism for human troubleshooters to issue fine-grained
control over the distributed software, e.g., slowing down the network execu-
tion for close examination and stopping the distributed software when certain
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conditions are met.
To remedy this issue and enhance the functionality of our architecture, we
analyze standalone testing and debugging tools [11, 12], and identify several
useful testing and debugging primitives for distributed software. One of the
most important primitives is the single-step primitive, which allows human
troubleshooters to slow down the execution of the distributed software, and
make the software progress in logical steps (e.g., every instruction count or
every link failures) instead of in real time. The primitive enables the trou-
bleshooters to analyze the state changes of the software after the execution
of each logical step. Another useful primitive is the breakpoint primitive,
which lets human troubleshooters to specify the network conditions they are
interested in, and stop the execution of the distributed software when these
conditions are met. Finally, the backtrace primitive can greatly reduce the
time and effort of testing and debugging distributed software by listing the
events that lead to certain network conditions. This allows troubleshooters
to learn what events lead to the bugs or defects currently observed. These
primitives complement the algorithms described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4,
and complete our testing and debugging architecture.
Earlier works attempt to support these testing and debugging primitives
with recordings [23]. When keeping recordings of the transmitted messages,
a tool can enable the single-step primitive by replay the recording entries
in logical steps. In addition, the tool can support the breakpoint primi-
tive by either dynamically checking the network state during replay or stat-
ically scanning through the message recordings for the desired network con-
ditions. Moreover, the backtrace primitive can be implemented by searching
the recordings in reverse order, or augmenting the replayed messages with
additional metadata marking the causal related events. While these works
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successfully implement these testing and debugging primitives, the record-
ings they depend on might not be suitable for general distributed software in
modern wide-area networks. As some authors of these works mentioned, the
huge storage requirements of comprehensive recordings often prevent these
solutions to be implemented in large-scale production networks [22, 24]. Fur-
thermore, to coordinate the distributed recordings, several tools need support
of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [23].
We address these problems by building the single-step, breakpoint, and
backtrace primitives through our designs of deterministic network execution
architecture to handle message events. More specifically, we introduce the
single-step primitive by designing a distributed lockstep execution algorithm.
Not only does this algorithm enable human troubleshooters to execute the
distributed software in logical steps, but it also perfectly reproduces the ex-
ecution of the distributed software instrumented by the algorithm described
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. In addition, we enable the breakpoint primi-
tive by breaking complicated network conditions into smaller conditions that
can be dynamically processed by individual participating network nodes. To
improve the efficiency of the system, we leverage the deterministic network
execution property to build a centralized negative cache of these network
conditions. Moreover, we provide the backtrace primitive by reproducing
the network execution to eliminate the need of additional comprehensive
recordings or metadata. Finally, we design a centralized testing and debug-
ging coordinator to enable human troubleshooters to issue these commands
to analyze the distributed software.
Standalone testing and debugging tools such as GDB [11] and LLDB [12]
provide the single-step, breakpoint, and backtrace primitives to reduce the
time and effort in analyzing troubleshooting standalone software projects.
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However, to the best of our knowledge, these testing and debugging primi-
tives are not widely supported for distributed software operating in modern
large-scale networks. In this Chapter, we leverage the deterministic network
execution algorithms described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to design a set of
testing and debugging primitives for distributed software. We evaluate our
implementation with a popular routing suite, XORP [25], on Emulab [65]
with Rocketfuel topologies [66] and Tier-1 ISP traces. The results show that
the primitives provided by our network architecture have reasonable response
time for human troubleshooters, and perform well in modern wide-area net-
works.
Roadmap: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1
describes the design and implementation of the single-step, breakpoint, and
backtrace primitives. Section 5.2 proves several core properties of our testing
and debugging architecture, and connects the primitives described in this
chapter with the algorithms in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Section 5.3 presents
the evaluation of our implementation with real-world distributed software on
Emulab. Section 5.4 concludes this chapter with a summary.
5.1 System Design and Implementation
In this section, we describe the detailed design and implementation of the
testing and debugging primitives supported by our network architecture.
First, we show the single-step primitive (Section 5.1.1), which allows a de-
bugging network to be “stepped” through in a manner controlled by a human
troubleshooter. Then, we discuss the breakpoint primitive (Section 5.1.2),
which enables troubleshooters to specify the network conditions that they are
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Figure 5.1: The system design of the supports for the testing and
debugging primitives.
interested in, and stops the network execution when the conditions are met.
Finally, we describe the backtrace primitive (Section 5.1.3), which lets trou-
bleshooters to find the causal related messages of a specific message event.
To detail the algorithms used to implement the primitives, we first give
an overview of the testing and debugging network architecture as shown in
Figure 5.1. In a testing and debugging network, our architecture leverages
a centralized testing and debugging coordinator to manage the participating
network nodes. Based on the scale and reliability requirements of the system,
this centralized coordinator can be a single machine or a cluster of computers.
Human troubleshooters utilize the coordinator to send testing and debugging
commands to the distributed software running in the network. The central-
ized control simplifies the process of analyze distributed bugs and defects.
On each network node, we design a local shim layer to receive commands
from and send information to the centralized coordinator. This layer inter-
cepts nondeterministic events such as messages and timers to implement the
testing and debugging primitives. In addition, to improve efficiency, we use
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the local shim layer to oﬄoad computations from the testing and debugging
coordinator. The architecture supports three major primitives as follows.
The single-step primitive: The tremendous load, scale, and rates of
change of modern networks make it hard for a human troubleshooter to
build an understanding of the entire distributed system’s state. Testing and
debugging such a system becomes much easier if the troubleshooter has time
to investigate and manipulate state, and slowly step through the operation
of individual messages.
To achieve such interactive stepping of software in wide-area networks, a
runtime coordinator manages execution across the distributed set of processes
making up the distributed software. This is done by logically dividing the
software’s execution into a series of logical steps. These steps may be chosen
at various levels of granularity (per-event or per-path-change). The coor-
dinator then runs the software in virtual time, executing it in a “lockstep”
fashion across nodes (alternating between event-sending and event-processing
phases). Distributed user-space substrates replay events to their local soft-
ware and collect outbound events to be sent in the next cycle. Nodes use a
distributed semaphore to coordinate. This approach controls execution, and
deterministically reproduces the software’s behavior by adopting the exact
pseudorandom ordering function used by the production network (Chapter 3).
The breakpoint primitive: As the complexity and scale of distributed
software increases, it becomes almost impossible to trace through the entire
execution of an instance of distributed software. To allow troubleshooters to
focus on the bugs and defects, the breakpoint primitive is needed to provide
the ability to search through the network execution of distributed software,
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and present the network conditions that the troubleshooters are interested
in.
We implement the breakpoint primitive by letting troubleshooters specify
the network conditions they are interested in. Then, the centralized coordi-
nator launches the distributed software with the lockstep algorithm used in
the single-step primitive but without constantly pausing the execution. The
coordinator and the local shim layers will check the conditions at each step
and stop the execution of distributed software when the conditions are met.
After that, the troubleshooters can use the single-step primitive to under-
stand the details of the software. Based on the characteristics of the network
conditions, we use distinct approaches to check them. If the conditions can
be checked locally (e.g., certain messages arrive at a certain network node),
we install the conditions on the respective local shim layers, and instruct
them to notify the centralized coordinator when the conditions are met. If
the conditions require to be checked globally (e.g., certain messages travel
through certain routes), we break these conditions into smaller conditions
that the local shim layers are able to handle. Then, the centralized coordi-
nator leverages the notifications to determine if the network conditions are
met.
The backtrace primitive: After using the breakpoint primitive to stop
the execution of the distributed software, human troubleshooters can lever-
age the single-step primitive to examine the states of the software moving
forward. To analyze the collection of past events that leads to the current
network conditions, we need the backtrace primitive to accomplish the task.
We leverage the deterministic network execution properties guaranteed by
the lockstep algorithm to achieve the backtrace primitive without using com-
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prehensive recordings or tagging all messages with additional metadata. The
lockstep algorithm used by the single-step primitive allows us to easily take
distributed snapshots of the distributed software. By using existing virtual
machine technologies [95, 96], we can save and restore the distributed soft-
ware states. With this ability to revert states, we implement the backtrace
primitive by roll back the current distributed software when the troubleshoot-
ers specify a message event. Then, we tags only newly generated messages
with specific metadata to track causal relationships. By doing so, our net-
work architecture can list all the messages events leading to the specified
event.
5.1.1 Stepping through Testing and Debugging Networks
In a network instance created to support network testing and debugging,
mechanistic delays and overheads are not significant concerns. Therefore, in
this environment, we introduce the single-step primitive which allows inter-
active stepping by forcing the network to execute in a lockstep fashion. This
is done by explicitly queuing messages and timer events received by a node,
and playing them at coordinated intervals using a predetermined ordering
function that is exactly the same as that used in the production network
(Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) to ensure determinism. To make the network
run in lockstep, our system instructs each node to cycle through two phases:
a transmission phase and a processing phase. The system coordinates all
nodes with a mechanism similar to a distributed semaphore to make sure
they are in the same phase at the same time. To ensure determinism, the
single-step primitive replays partially logged external events according to
the group numbers they received in the production network. In a testing
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and debugging network, one group of events is replayed at a time. When
all messages are output, the next group is replayed. The nodes use TCP for
communication in order to ensure that messages are not lost, which is nec-
essary for determinism. Alternatively, we can also record these message-loss
events, and replay them in the testing and debugging network.
Transmission phase: In this phase, each node transmits all messages gen-
erated in the previous processing phase. That is, the node sends out mes-
sages in a send buffer (filled in the processing phase) and stores all messages
received in a receive buffer. The single-step primitive then uses the same
ordering function used in the production network over the received messages
to compute the order in which the messages are to be delivered to the ap-
plication. Hence, the messages in the receive buffer are sorted in the same
way as they are received in the production network, thereby ensuring the
same ordering of events. This results in the testing and debugging network
reproducing the execution of the production network. To indicate readiness
to transition to the processing phase, a node sends a marker packet when it
has no further messages to send.
Processing phase: In this phase, each node processes all messages re-
ceived during the previous transmission phase. In particular, the node sends
all messages in the receive buffer up to the distributed software, and enqueues
the software’s generated messages into the send buffer. The node moves to
the transmission phase after the distributed software processes all messages
in the receive buffer.
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5.1.2 Searching for Specific Network Conditions
As a first step towards supporting distributed breakpoint without compre-
hensive recordings, our architecture targets breakpoints related to message
events. We build the breakpoint primitive upon the lockstep algorithm used
by the single-step primitive. We improve the algorithm by instructing local
shim layers to dynamically check network conditions specified by human trou-
bleshooters. We set up shim layers to check for local conditions (conditions
targeting a single network device), and break global conditions (conditions
involving a set of network devices) into multiple local conditions. Further-
more, our architecture negatively caches network states and conditions to
avoid checking unnecessary events.
Checking network conditions: To check network conditions, we aug-
ment the lockstep algorithm in Section 5.1.1 and instruct each local shim
layer to check for specific conditions during the processing phase. In the
processing phase, our architecture instruct the local shim layer to deliver
messages in the receive buffer up to the distributed software, and check the
installed local conditions after each message is processed. To improve the
breakpoint granularity, the shim layer can use system calls such as ptrace()
to check conditions on machine-instruction level. Nevertheless, for efficiency
and usability, checking network conditions on message level is sufficient for
most distributed software.
Handling local conditions: The testing and debugging process can be
simplified if the architecture can stop the distributed software when local
conditions are satisfied. Examples of these local conditions include that
certain messages arrive at a specific network node, or that a certain number
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of messages seen by a designated network device reaches a predetermined
value. To efficiently handle these conditions, we build hash tables in each
local shim layer to store the fields of messages that human troubleshooters are
interested in. We use only has table for the incoming messages and the other
for the outgoing messages to allow troubleshooters to install more specific
conditions. In addition, we associate a counter for each hash table entries to
enable breakpoints related to the number of messages received.
Dealing with global conditions: To extend the breakpoint primitive to
check global conditions, we instruct the centralized coordinator to break a
global condition into multiple local conditions. Then, the centralized coor-
dinator installs these local conditions in the local shim layers. Based on the
global condition specified by the human troubleshooter, the centralized coor-
dinator orders the local conditions in a causally related order. For example,
when checking if a specific path is taken by a message, the centralized coordi-
nator order the local conditions from the starting network node of the path
to the ending network node. (The centralized coordinate can also handle
concurrent local conditions.) When a local condition is met, the local shim
layer notifies the centralized coordinator, and the coordinator uses a state
machine to check whether a collection of local conditions forms a global con-
dition. Since the lockstep algorithm already deterministically preserves the
ordering of distributed events, our architecture can correctly identify the
global conditions.
Improving efficiency with negative caches: With the deterministic
network execution properties provided by the lockstep algorithm, we can
further improve the efficiency of the breakpoint primitive. More specifically,
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since the distributed software executed deterministically, when the network
state is the same, the external events that didn’t trigger any breakpoint
before will not satisfy any breakpoint afterwards. Thus, we implement the
centralized coordinator to negatively cache the combination of network states
(Section 5.1.3) and external events to identify the messages that local shim
layers can safely ignore. After finding these events, the centralized coordina-
tor instructs the local shim layer that receives the external event to mark the
corresponding message events. When a local shim layer observes a marked
message, it skips the breakpoint checking process and, in addition, marks
the causally related outputs. This caching optimization greatly reduces the
computation and communication overhead.
5.1.3 Tracing Events Leading to the Network Condition
Our testing and debugging architecture implements the backtrace primitive
to complement the single-step and breakpoint primitives by allowing human
troubleshooters to track the set of causally related message events leading to
a specific network condition. To avoid using comprehensive recordings that
hinder scalability, we leverage the deterministic network execution properties
provided by the lockstep algorithm described in Section 5.1.1 to checkpoint
and roll back the network states, and dynamically reproduce the desired mes-
sage events by marking newly generated messages and tracking the messages
causally related to them.
Checkpointing network states: The lockstep algorithm described in
Section 5.1.1 replays external events from a single group at a time (Chap-
ter 3). Between replaying different groups of events, the network architecture
has no messages in transit. Thus, our testing and debugging architecture can
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readily checkpoint network states right after the lockstep algorithm finishes
replaying a group of external events. Since there are no messages in transit, in
our implementation, we instruct the centralized coordinator to request local
checkpoint from each local shim layer. Alternatively, we can also adopt one
of the distributed snapshot algorithms to obtain a snapshot of the network
states [40, 97, 98].
Finding causally related message events: When troubleshooters need
to track the set of causally related message events that lead to a particular
message event or a specific network state. We roll back the network state by
applying the latest checkpoint we stored with the centralized coordinator. To
find the causally related message events that lead to a single message event,
we mark each newly generated message with distinct identifiers. Then, we
propagate each identifier to the causally related outgoing messages. Each
local shim layer records messages with the identifiers. When the targeted
message event is generated, it will obtain a particular identifier. The cen-
tralized coordinator uses that identifier to gather store message events from
the local shim layers. Note that although our implementation is similar to
the existing packet tracking systems [49, 56, 57, 58, 59], unlike those systems
that require to intercept all message events, our architecture only needs to
mark message events in a single group. To track causally related message
events across multiple groups, we can iteratively apply the algorithm.
5.2 System Properties
The design of the testing and debugging primitives described in Section 5.1
are closely connected to the algorithms introduced in Chapter 3 and Chap-
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ter 4. To simplify the process of analyzing bugs and defects observed in
production networks, a testing and debugging architecture should reproduce
the exact network execution of the distributed software when using these
primitives in testing and debugging networks. We design our testing and
debugging primitives to not only be able to explore all possible network exe-
cution paths of distributed software, but also can be instructed to perfectly
reproduce the network execution of the software in the production networks
by using the same pseudorandom ordering function (Chapter 3). Here, we
formally prove that the reproducibility properties of our network architec-
ture. More specifically, in this section, we prove two properties of our testing
and debugging architecture:
1. The single-step primitive exactly reproduces the execution of the pro-
duction network instrumented by DEFINED (described in Chapter 3)
or the deterministic network execution algorithm using synchronized
clocks (described in Chapter 4).
2. Even with the presence of cascading rollbacks (i.e., rollbacks across
nodes), DEFINED eventually terminates.
The first property is the core of our testing and debugging architecture, as
it provides reproducibility of network execution. The second property guar-
antees there will be no deadlocks when a production network is instrumented
by DEFINED, and the distributed software will always be ready for testing
and debugging.
To prove the single-step primitive reproduces the execution of the pro-
duction network instrumented by DEFINED or the deterministic network
execution algorithm using synchronized clocks, we use Netzer and Miller’s
lemma which states a sufficient condition for reproducing an execution.
90
Lemma 5.1. (Netzer and Miller [99]) If the order of the messages in a
replay is the same as that in the original execution, the replay reproduces the
original execution.
We then prove the core property of our testing and debugging architecture
with Lemma 5.1.
Theorem 5.2. (Reproducibility Theorem) By replaying the partial recording
of the production network instrumented by DEFINED or the deterministic
network execution algorithm using synchronized clocks, the single-step prim-
itive reproduces its execution.
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, it is sufficient to prove that the order of the messages
in the production network is the same as that in the testing and debugging
network. We will prove the statement by considering the following two cases:
1. Two messages received at a node have different group numbers.
2. Two messages received at a node have the same group number.
First, we consider the case where two messages m and m′ have different
group numbers. Without loss of generality, let’s assume m has a smaller
group number than m′. In the production network, each process sorts the
messages by group numbers in ascending order, so m is processed before
m′. In the testing and debugging network, messages with different groups
numbers are also executed by group number in ascending order, so, again, m
is processed before m′. Thus, if two messages have different group numbers,
the order of the messages in both networks is the same.
Now, we consider the case where two messages m and m′ have the same
group number. Without loss of generality, let’s assume m is ordered before m′
by the ordering function. In the production network, each process sorts the
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messages with the same group number by leveraging the ordering function,
so m is processed before m′. In the testing and debugging network, messages
with the same group numbers are also executed according to the ordering
function, so, again, m is processed before m′. Thus, if two messages have
the same group numbers, the order of the messages in both networks is the
same.
Combining the two cases, we have proved that the order of the messages
in the production network is the same as that in the testing and debug-
ging network. Further, the partial recording ensures that external events
are replayed in the testing and debugging network in the same manner as
that of the production network. Thus, by Lemma 5.1, we conclude that the
single-step primitive reproduces the execution of the production network in-
strumented by DEFINED or the deterministic network execution algorithm
using synchronized clocks.
To prove a production network instrumented by DEFINED eventually
makes progress even with the presence of cascading rollbacks, we introduce
Jefferson’s lemma, which proves the network eventually terminates under a
single group number.
Lemma 5.3. (Jefferson [42]) In a production network instrumented by DE-
FINED, under a group number g, let global virtual time (GVTg) be the earliest
virtual time to which any node can ever again roll back. Then, under a group
number g, GVTg eventually increases.
With the help of Lemma 5.3, we use mathematical induction to prove that
a production network instrumented by DEFINED makes progress.
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Theorem 5.4. (Termination Theorem) Given a finite set of external events,
a production network instrumented by DEFINED eventually makes progress.
Proof. Given a finite set of external messages, we know that the production
network makes progress as long as the cascading rollbacks terminate. Thus,
we will prove that the cascading rollbacks eventually terminates.
By Lemma 5.3, we know that under a group number g, GVTg gradually
surpasses all message timestamps in the group, so eventually, no messages in
group g will be rolled back because of another message in the same group.
In addition, by induction, we will prove that eventually, no messages will
be rolled back because of messages in another group. First, let’s consider the
base case by inspecting the first group: because the production network sorts
messages by group numbers, no messages in the first group will be rolled back
because of messages in another group. Now, assume that for all groups with
group number less than g, no messages will be rolled back because of messages
in another group. Then, because the production network sorts messages by
group numbers, eventually, all the messages that could roll back messages in
group g settles. Hence, no messages in group g will be rolled back because
of messages in another group. By induction, eventually, no messages will be
rolled back because of messages in another group.
In summary, we have proved that the cascading rollbacks eventually ter-
minate, so the production network eventually makes progress.
5.3 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our implementation of the testing and debug-
ging primitives on the XORP software routing platform [25]. To analyze
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the performance and scalability of the implementation in various network
environments, we execute the experiments on the Emulab testbed with both
real-world topologies gathered by Rocketfuel [66] and synthetic topologies
generated by BRITE [80]. To further examine the efficiency of the testing
and debugging primitive in real-world situations, we use network traces from
a Tier-1 ISP. In the remainder of the section, we first present the performance
results (Section 5.3.1), and then discuss the scalability results (Section 5.3.2).
Metrics: Since different testing and debugging primitives have different
purposes, we are concerned with different “success metrics” for each. As the
single-step and backtrace primitives are designed for use in a testing and
debugging network for interactive analysis, we measure their response time
for user-driven commands (e.g., a step command). On the other hand, the
breakpoint primitive is used to search for specific network conditions, we
examine the processing overhead it adds to each message.
5.3.1 Performance
We measure the response time of the single-step primitive, as it is designed
to support interactive testing and debugging and should respond quickly to
commands from the human troubleshooter. Figure 5.2 shows the cumulative
distribution function of the response time to execute a single step command
of the single-step primitive (where a single step is measured as the time
to complete a transmission phase and a processing phase as described in
Section 5.1.1). In this scenario every step requires less than a second.
Then, we measure the processing time of the breakpoint primitive on each
network node. When searching for the network condition specified by trou-
bleshooters, the breakpoint primitive looks up each received message in the
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Figure 5.2: Network-level results of Sprintlink topology with Tier-1 OSPF
traces: response time of the single-step primitive.
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Figure 5.3: Node-level results of Sprintlink topology with Tier-1 OSPF
traces: processing time of the breakpoint primitive.
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Figure 5.4: Network-level results of Sprintlink topology with Tier-1 OSPF
traces: trace time of the backtrace primitive.
hash table of local conditions. Figure 5.3 depicts the results. When process-
ing the messages without optimizations, each message needs an additional
0.1 ms on each network node. We can reduce this additional processing time
by an order of magnitude with negative caches to avoid checking messages
that are known to not trigger any breakpoint (Section 5.1.2).
Finally, we examine the response time of the backtrace primitive. In this
experiment, we randomly select a message event in the testing and debugging
network, and use the backtrace primitive to find all the causally related
message events that lead to the selected message event. We measure the time
between that the human troubleshooter issues the backtrace command to that
the centralized coordinator returns the set of causally related messages. As
Figure 5.4 demonstrates, the response time is always less and 1.5 seconds.
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single-step primitive.
5.3.2 Scalability
To evaluate the single-step primitive, we measure how its response time scales
with network size. Figure 5.5 shows that while the delay of the single-step
primitive increases with network size, it increases slowly. In addition, even
when the network size grows to 80 nodes, the average delay remains below
0.8 seconds.
Then, we measure the scalability of the breakpoint primitive by installing
a global condition that involves different number of local conditions (Sec-
tion 5.1.2). To examine the additional processing overhead each message
experiences through the network, we record only the processing time and
ignore the transmission delay. Figure 5.6 shows that our implementation
incurs only a 2.5-ms processing overhead even when the global breakpoint
condition involves 10 network nodes. This overhead can be further reduced
to 2 ms with the use of negative caches.
Finally, we evaluate the scalability of the backtrace primitive by varying
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the size of the network. As we can observe from Figure 5.7, the result shows
that the response time increases slowly when the network size increases. The
average response time is always less than 1.4 seconds for the centralized
coordinator to list all the causally related message events that lead to an
operator-specified network condition.
5.4 Summary
Testing and debugging primitives such as single-step, breakpoint, and back-
trace can greatly simplify the process of understanding and analyzing bugs
and defects of distributed software. With the lockstep algorithm, we imple-
ment the single-step primitive that perfectly reproduce the network execution
of the distributed software instrumented with the deterministic network ex-
ecution algorithms described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. In addition, the
single-step primitive enables troubleshooters to slow down the execution of
the distributed software, and analyze the dynamics of the software in de-
tails. We design the breakpoint primitive by efficiently utilizing the local
shim layer. Furthermore, we adopt negative caches to reduce the computa-
tion and communication overhead. The deterministic execution properties
of the architecture assist us in implementing the backtrace primitive. We
use checkpoints and identifier metadata to track causally related message
events that lead to a particular network condition. Evaluations with real-
world distributed software show that these testing and debugging primitives
can perform efficiently and at scale.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we describe our design and implementation of a network ar-
chitecture for interactive testing and debugging of distributed software. The
architecture complements existing model checking troubleshooting solutions
by enabling operators to investigate distributed bugs and defects. In addi-
tion, by eliminating internal nondeterminism to enable deterministic network
execution, our design and implementation greatly improve the scalability
of prior works using comprehensive recordings to support interactive trou-
bleshooting. We analyze the characteristics of different types of traffics in
modern networks to make our architecture handle both control and data
traffic efficiently. Moreover, we leverage the deterministic network execu-
tion properties to build testing and debugging primitives such as single-step,
breakpoint, and backtrace.
To enable deterministic network execution of control traffic, we leverage
speculative execution and design a novel pseudorandom ordering function to
order internal events in networks. We implement a library to intercept mes-
sage and timer events of the control software, and order them on each network
node using an ordering function chosen independently to other nodes. If a
network node receives events in a wrong order, we use a modified fork()
system call to roll back the state of the distributed software, and replay the
events in the correct order specified by the pseudorandom ordering function.
Our design ensures the efficiency by incorporating locality information into
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the ordering function. The implementation properly handles the small-sized
and broadcast messages generated by control software such as XORP and
Quagga.
To ensure deterministic network execution of data traffic, we use time
synchronization protocols and design a novel buffering mechanisms to deliver
internal events to network nodes. We implement a Linux kernel module to
insert timestamps to messages before sending them to another network node,
and buffer these messages after receiving them at the receiving node. We
force deterministic transmission latency on each network path by buffering
the messages according to the tagged timestamps before delivering them to
the data software. Due to the small variance of one-way delay observed in
modern networks, our design is able to efficiently transfer data information.
The implementation successfully handles elephant flows generated by data
software such as lighttpd.
To further reduce the time and effort on testing and debugging distributed
software, we design and implement several useful primitives. The single-step
primitive allows troubleshooters to slow down the execution of distributed
software, and analyze the behaviors and interactions of software instances
repeatedly and in details. In addition, the breakpoint primitive enables trou-
bleshooters to quickly locate possible bugs and defects of distributed software
by rapidly forward through unrelated events. Finally, the backtrace primitive
lets troubleshooters list all causally related messages that lead to a specific
message that the troubleshooters are interested in. We implement these
primitives efficiently by using the deterministic network properties provided
by our network architecture.
Our thesis inspires several future works as follows:
101
Testing and debugging across Autonomous Systems: Our network
architecture requires controls over all participating network nodes. Although
this requirement doesn’t prevent troubleshooters testing and debugging dis-
tributed software such as implementations of OSPF and HTTP, it can become
an issue when operators attempt to analyze other distributed software such as
implementations of BGP. To address this, we would like to extend our archi-
tecture to allow multiple troubleshooters from different Autonomous Systems
to cooperatively and securely test and debug a protocol implementation.
Constructing hybrid architecture: Although testing and debugging tech-
niques using comprehensive recordings face serious issues in scalability, they
can be used to efficiently implement some debugging primitives such as back-
trace. We would like to extend our implementation to provide a hybrid
architecture which leverages both deterministic network execution and com-
prehensive recordings. The architecture should be able to select an execution
mode based on network conditions and operators’ requests.
Implementing more testing and debugging primitives: The single-
step, breakpoint, backtrace primitives allow troubleshooters to quickly locate
important network events, and examine software behavior both backwards
and forwards in time. However, we still would like to implement more testing
and debugging primitives such as print (displaying specific network states)
or tracepoint (profiling the distributed software).
Providing user interfaces: In this thesis, we focus on the core algorithms
and functionalities, but not the interface to human troubleshooters. We
would like to complete our system by building a user that allows operators
to easily specify the network conditions or internal events they are interested
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in, and to conveniently examine network behaviors and issue testing and
debugging primitive.
Designing applications with deterministic network execution: De-
terministic network execution enables us to create an efficient and scalable
interactive testing and debugging network architecture for distributed soft-
ware. Moreover, it can also be useful for applications such as replication
and security. We would like to explore more possible applications for our
architecture, and extend its functionalities.
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